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This dissertation explores what influences consumer financial decisions with 
consequences that recur over time, such as mortgages and recurring payment plans in contracts.  
This dissertation investigates two questions: (1) How do individual differences in intertemporal 
preferences influence how consumers think about recurring financial events? (2) How does the 
aggregation level used to describe the recurring financial consequences impact how consumers 
mentally represent the purchase?  Taken together, this dissertation explores how consumers 
mentally represent recurring outcomes and express these preferences through choice.  
 The first essay explores the relationship between individual differences in time 
preferences and decisions involving recurring payments in the domain of mortgage choices.  It 
relates two components of an individual’s time preference, a present bias (overvaluing 
immediate outcomes), and a personal discount rate (the exponential component of time 
preferences), to mortgage selection and the decision to strategically abandon a home worth less 
than its mortgage.  
Combining insights from an analytic model and a survey of 244 mortgaged households 
augmented by zip-code market house price data, this essay proposes that consumers with greater 
present bias and exponential discounting are more likely to choose mortgages that minimize up-
front costs and be underwater. This model also suggests that present bias decreases the likelihood 




the data.  Time preferences remain robust predictors with individual and market-level controls, 
and alternate model specifications.  
The second essay explores how the aggregation level of a recurring price (e.g. on a daily 
vs. a yearly basis) impacts how consumers mentally account for a contract’s benefits.  For 
example, if consumers are told the daily price of a car lease, they imagine the daily benefits of 
the car, and when they are told a monthly price they imagine their broader use of the car.  This 
essay builds on the “pennies-a-day” model (Gourville 1998), which posits that narrowly framed 
recurring costs can increase a consumer’s willingness to purchase by making the cost of a 
purchase seem trivial.  The essay will present evidence that triviality is neither a necessary nor 
sufficient condition for narrow framing to increase willingness to purchase and expand the 
domain of situations where such narrow framing increases purchase.   Five web-based 
experiments suggest that scope insensitivity plays an important role in this effect since under 
recurring costs, consumers  repeatedly "book" the most valued units, while under one-time costs 
consumers tend to experience less return to scale. 
Together, the two essays suggest that contracts involving recurring financial events are 
mentally represented differently from those with one-time financial events, and that content is 
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On Decisions Across Time 
Many consumer financial decisions have consequences that recur over time.  For 
example, mortgages and other contracts involve a discrete set of payments made periodically.  
Often, consumers’ largest financial decisions involve contracts that result in paying or receiving 
money repeatedly, as many financial products by design enable consumption smoothing and/or 
committing future income to finance a large purchase today.  To properly respond to consumer 
needs and improve consumer welfare, marketers must understand how consumers evaluate 
recurring financial events. 
Life cycle models of consumption in standard economic theory generally assume that 
consumers will treat a contract with recurring financial events, such as a mortgage,  as equivalent 
to its net present value as a one-time event (Lambrecht and Tucker 2012).  For example, 
Campbell and Cocco (2003) model consumer mortgage choice by optimizing the discounted 
lifetime consumption subject to income constraints.  However, consumers generally respond 
differently to one-time financial events and recurring financial events in predictable ways.  First, 
consumers generally do not spontaneously combine outcomes when presented with a decision 
involving recurring financial events (Thaler and Johnson 1990).  Second, they tend to separately 
account for a contract’s gain or loss in each period (known as period-level bracketing) rather 
than integrating all gains and losses of the contract (Lambrecht and Tucker 2012) and this 
influences choices, for example, by shortening the investment horizon (Bernartzi and Thaler 
1995).  Conceptually, the difference between one-shot and recurring financial events differs from 
narrow vs. broad choice bracketing (Read, Loewenstein and Rabin 1998) in that both recurring 





bracketed.  This dissertation further explores how consumers evaluate recurring financial events 
under period-level bracketing. 
In certain ways, all financial decisions involve recurring financial consequences.  Some, 
such as mortgages, carry explicit financial consequences, but even one-shot financial events have 
consequences over time, as a dollar spent today is unavailable tomorrow.  However, in the latter 
case consumers often ignore these implicit costs (Frederick et al. 2009) so this dissertation is 
primarily concerned with financial decisions involving explicit series of financial events.  In this 
regard, recurring financial events differ from one-time financial events due to two characteristic 
features:  First, in recurring financial events, some events occur later than other events in the 
series, and second, recurring financial events divides an equivalent one-time financial event into 
multiple events.  To the extent that consumers think about opportunity costs of one-shot costs as 
affecting the future, the insights from this dissertation on recurring financial events are 
generalizable to all financial events. 
Extant theories make opposing predictions about consumers’ attitudes toward recurring 
financial events.  The hedonic editing principles associated with Prospect theory suggest that 
consumers should prefer to segregate gains and aggregate losses (Thaler 1985).  Yet if 
consumers discount future events (Samuelson 1937), segregating gains has the potential to delay 
(and hence discount) positive events, and aggregating losses has the potential to accelerate (and 
hence exaggerate) losses.  The empirical evidence suggests that consumers often prefer to 
separate gains or losses over time
1
 (Thaler and Johnson 1990; Linville and Fischer 1991) and 
prefer increasing to decreasing series of incomes (Loewenstein and Sicherman 1991). 
                                                          
1
 While consumers at times prefer to combine losses with gains when the gains can cancel losses, they tend 





This dissertation first explores how consumers evaluate recurring financial events by 
applying recent advances in the behavioral discounting literature to the domain of mortgage 
choices.  Standard economic models typically assume a low intertemporal discount rate, close to 
that of the interest rate, in normative models of consumer behavior.  However the research on 
temporal discounting typically finds much higher rates of year-over-year discounting – findings 
showing that a given asset loses 20-30% (or more) of value per year of are not uncommon 
(Hausman 1979; Harrison et al. 2002).  Additionally, abundant evidence suggests that dynamic 
inconsistencies in inter-temporal preferences (i.e. declining discount rates over time, such as that 
of Laibson’s quasi-hyperbolic discounting model (1997)) can produce preference reversals 
(Frederick et al. 2002) due to a present bias, which overvalues events in the present over those in 
the future.  In this dissertation, both essays relate with intertemporal discounting.  Essay I 
extends this literature by investigating the role of individual differences in present bias and 
exponential discounting on mortgage choices.  Essay II is careful to control for the role of 
intertemporal preferences in order to explore whether recurring financial events and one-time 
financial events call to mind fundamentally different content. 
Second, the financial events themselves do not exist in a vacuum. Before events can be 
evaluated based on their point in time, the events themselves must be characterized.  In this 
process, financial events are evaluated based on what they bring to mind.  Essay I will discuss 
the importance of the social, moral and conceptual context in which mortgage decisions are 
made.  Essay II will more explicitly test how framing a financial event in aggregate or as a 
recurring event changes what gets called to mind, in violation of the economic principle of 





events are mentally represented differently from those with one-time financial events, and that 
content is then discounted based on intertemporal preferences. 
In what follows, the first essay examines the relationship between inherent preferences 
and financial choices involving recurring consequences.  Specifically, this essay tests for the 
relationship between intertemporal preferences, including present bias and a personal 
(exponential) discount rate, and mortgage choices leading to negative home equity, as well as 
willingness to strategically default from a home with negative home equity.  This domain is of 
both substantial and theoretical interest, as it both relates with life-altering financial choices 
made by millions of Americans over the past decade that severely affected the economy, and as a 
representative financial decision that involved recurring consequences and was influenced by 
inherent preferences. 
That essay reports the results from a survey of mortgaged homeowners that was 
augmented with third party data about local economic conditions.  It utilizes a recently 
introduced method of eliciting multiple parameters characterizing time and risk preferences that 
dynamically selects choice alternatives and leverages response heterogeneity (Toubia et al. 
2012).  Additionally, it estimates a series of regressions and simultaneous equations using 3-
stage least squares.  These models control for a variety of individual and economic factors and 
exploring alternate formulations of key parameters as robustness checks. 
The second essay examines how contextual factors influence financial choices involving 
recurring consequences.  Specifically, this essay investigates how consumers use payment 
frequency as a cue about how frequently to “book” nonmonetary consequences associated with 
the transaction.  When price is framed as a frequent event, consumers account for the 





to the full transaction.  When particular benefits are valued highly, such as in the case of scope-
insensitive preferences, more frequent booking can increase purchase intentions.  
Methodologically, the second essay reports results from five web-based behavioral 
experiments, several pretests and supplemental studies.  These studies largely build on the 
pennies-a-day paradigm (Gourville 1998) to isolate how payment frequency influences purchase 
intentions independently of time preferences.  The first study manipulates payment frequency 
(daily vs. yearly) to see whether participants anticipate that donating to a charity will be more 
rewarding when the costs are framed narrowly.  Through simultaneously estimated equations, 
this study evaluates whether this happens in addition to, and controlling for, how payment 
frequency influences perceptions of cost (e.g. triviality).  The second study replicates this result 
for a car lease, a product category with nontrivial costs.  The third study also manipulates 
affective involvement to explore the role of scope insensitivity.  The fourth and fifth studies 
evaluate participants’ assessments of particular days and responses to other scales to test various 
explanations of the effect and address methodological gaps of the previous studies. 
The rest of this document is organized as follows.  Essays 1 and 2 appear in the next two 
sections.  Following the essays, the final chapter contains general commentary and discussion of 
future research directions.  Together, both time preferences and contextual cues affect 
consumers’ perceptions of recurring financial events.  Consumers tend to adopt the period of a 
recurring financial event as periods to evaluate the overall contract, and then the contract’s 









 Essay I: 
Time Preferences, Mortgage Choice 








Mortgage choice is a consequential consumer choice that highlights the role of time 
preferences in determining outcomes. This essay relates two components of an individual’s time 
preference, a present bias (overvaluing immediate outcomes), and a personal discount rate, to 
mortgage choice and the decision to strategically abandon a home worth less than its mortgage. 
An analytic model, a survey of 244 mortgaged households augmented by zip-code market house 
price data, and a nationally-representative sample of US households together show that 
consumers with greater present bias and discounting are more likely to choose mortgages that 
minimize up-front costs and be underwater.  The model also suggests that present bias decreases 
the likelihood of walking away, but higher discounting increases that likelihood, a result 
consistent with the data.  Time preferences remain robust predictors with individual and market-
level controls, as well as alternate model specifications.  
 
Introduction 
Selecting a mortgage is often the single largest financial choice made by many consumers 
(Campbell and Cocco 2003), yet these choices have received little attention in marketing (for an 
exception, see Lee and Hogarth 1999).  Mortgage choices are important consumer decisions to 
study, both because of their significant welfare impact and for theoretical reasons because they 
involve decisions across time and commitment in the long term.  One central factor in mortgage 
choice involves time preferences:  because mortgage choices typically involve commitments of 
30 years of payments, it is particularly important to understand how consumers trade off savings 





In light of the outcomes from mortgage choices in the last decade, there is reason to 
suspect that standard economic analysis may not fully explain consumer mortgage choices.  
Under a typical intertemporal economic model, households select mortgages to optimize their 
expected lifetime consumption, discounting future events exponentially, that is, by a constant 
factor for each period of time delay (Campbell and Cocco, 2003).  Yet a large number of 
American homeowners now live in homes worth less than the amount owed on their mortgage 
(Zillow 2012; Federal Reserve 2012a).  Additionally, some homeowners are “strategically” 
abandoning their mortgage (i.e. defaulting even if they can afford mortgage payments) – or 
failing to default – against the of counsel of normative exponential discounting models.  Both 
underwater homeownership and strategic default can have a marked impact upon health of the 
economy as a whole (Federal Reserve 2012b). 
This essay applies a different approach to understanding mortgage choices.  To better 
understand these decisions, this essay examines, both analytically and empirically, how 
behavioral models of time preference (Frederick, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue 2002; 
Loewenstein and Thaler 1989) influence the choice of a mortgage and the decision to abandon 
one’s current obligation, and demonstrate that the predictions of these models are quite different 
than those of standard economic analysis.  In particular, this essay applies to mortgage choice a 
model with two components of individual time preference: first, the exponential discount rate of 
extant models of mortgage choice, and second, a present bias, which is the tendency to overvalue 
immediate outcomes (Phelps and Pollack 1968; Laibson 1997). 
This essay proposes that individual differences in time preferences explain an important 
part of the related decisions to buy and maintain a mortgage.  Past research has found that 





individual differences in time preference are an important predictor in many life outcomes 
including smoking, body-mass index, savings towards retirement, and credit card debt (Chabris 
et al. 2008; Reimers et al. 2009).  In the domain of mortgage choice, this essay proposes and 
finds that while exponential discounting has a main effect to produce mortgage choices that 
undervalue later outcomes relative to earlier outcomes, present bias places homeowners at 
greater risk from negative housing market shocks both in mortgage choice and abandonment. 
In housing decisions benefits typically precede costs, while in contrast, abandoning 
mortgages often has the reverse profile.  As an analytical model will show, exponential 
discounters and present-biased homeowners are more likely to accept back-loaded mortgages 
that place them at greater risk of becoming underwater following negative home price shocks.  
However, the two types of discounting have different effects on the decision to default once 
underwater.  Exponential discounters will walk away because neither the promise of a fully-
owned home in the distant future nor the immediate pain of moving outweigh the fact that rent 
costs less than their mortgage payment.  In contrast, present biased homeowners will continue to 
make mortgage payments because the short-term costs associated with losing the home and 
moving are prohibitive. 
Focusing on more behaviorally informed models and individual differences may be 
important for three reasons: First, misunderstanding time preferences may have contributed to 
the current crisis by encouraging consumers to become more highly leveraged in a single sector 
of the economy and thus more exposed to negative housing market shocks.  Second, 
understanding time preferences may help design successful interventions by structuring 
incentives most likely to appeal to underwater homeowners considering whether to default on 





financial choices that involve streams of expenditures and consumption over time such as 
retirement savings, wealth decumulation and others.  In that sense, mortgage choice is a useful 
context to understand the implications of time preferences across a wide range of consumer 
financial decisions. 
 
Time Preference and Mortgage Choice: An Illustration 
To provide an intuition for the approach, consider models that propose that there are two 
components of individual time preference: a present bias (a tendency to overvalue immediate 
outcomes) and an exponential discount rate for outcomes beyond the present. To develop the 
hypotheses, one can compare the behavior of these quasi-hyperbolic (Phelps and Pollak 1968; 
Laibson 1997) consumers to that expected from a standard exponential model--the key difference 
between the models is the presence or absence of a “present bias.” (For other analytical work in 
marketing that applies behavioral models of time preference in consumer behavior see 
Zauberman (2003) who applies the concept to explain lock-in, Gilpatric (2009) who develops an 
analytical model to explore its effect on mail-in rebates, and Machado and Sinha (2007) who 
apply it to smoking cessation.  Time-inconsistent discounting has also been explored in the 
marketing literature by Prelec and Loewenstein (1997) who discuss the implications of declining 
impatience over time (Ainslie 1975) and Lambrecht and Tucker (2012) who discuss time period-
level bracketing in contract choice.)  Since it is important to understand and control for market 
effects and other kinds of individual differences, the empirical analysis models the effect of real 
estate prices, liquidity, risk attitude, loss aversion, financial literacy, social contagion, and moral 





affect choice, this essay examines how individual differences in both present bias and the 
exponential discount rate affect choice.  
One mortgage contract (see Carroll et al. 2009; DellaVigna and Malmendier 2004 for 
models of optimal contract design for present biased consumers and Prelec and Loewenstein 
(1998) illustrate how to optimally time and link payment and consumption events),  the “2 and 
28” mortgage (Mayer, Pence and Sherlund 2009), is a hybrid of an initial 2-year fixed-rate 
mortgage and a 28-year adjustable.  It has an low initial rate (for example, 7.25 percent) that 
becomes much higher at the end of the 2-year introductory period, for example 11.81 percent, set 
according to the London Interbank Borrowing Rate (LIBOR) and includes a premium (typically 
5.975 percent) (Johnson and Mayer 2011). For example, in June of 2005, a $250,000 mortgage 
would have initial payments of $1,705.44, which increased to $2,507 in the twenty-fifth month. 
These mortgages are very attractive in the short term but not the long term. Many other mortgage 
instruments have similar intertemporal characteristics, and move debt to latter periods, including 
refinancing one’s home to recover equity, home equity loans, and interest-only adjustable-rate 
mortgages. 
From the lender’s perspective, these mortgages perform an important function. There is 
considerable uncertainty about some borrowers’ ability of to repay loans, particularly those 
(subprime) with low credit ratings. The logic behind a 2/28 loan was that the large payments that 
follow the first two years would ensure that it would appeal to only those who are willing or able 
to improve their credit ratings. The argument in standard economics is that after two years of 
making payments and with their improved credit score, these more trustworthy borrowers would 
refinance into better loans. Thus 2/28 mortgages were seen as a tool that allowed consumers to 





selection because only potential prime borrowers would select this mortgage (Mayer, Pence and 
Sherlund 2009). More generally, a decade ago, subprime mortgages like the 2/28 mortgage 
seemed to offer a promising route to home ownership to those unable to qualify for traditional 
mortgage financing. Of course, this is not what happened.  The promising alternatives such as 
2/28 mortgages have turned out to be a nightmare, for both lenders and homeowners. 
While unscrupulous or overly optimistic borrowers and lenders played a role in the 
mortgage crisis, behavioral models of time preferences may also help explain the choices made 
by consumers and mistaken judgments made by banks.  Mortgages like the 2/28 were 
particularly appealing to present-biased individuals because they presented lower upfront costs in 
return for greater later costs. In fact, these mortgages did not protect lenders against adverse 
selection, but instead were magnets for present-biased borrowers, who are inclined to utilize 
alternative financial vehicles for immediate gain at the expense of future fallout.  The model also 
suggests present-biased people are less likely to say they will walk away from their underwater 
properties, again a result not apparent in a standard model. The intuition behind this argument is 
that more present-biased people will overweight the immediate costs of moving such as finding a 
rental, removing children from schools, etc. 
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows: First, it reviews a traditional 
economic analysis of mortgage choice.  It then discusses three behaviorally informed and model-
based hypotheses about mortgage choice and abandonment.  Third, it describes a data set 
combining both commercial market data and the survey responses of 244 households, of whom 
half were underwater.  The data suggests that both present-bias and high rates of exponential 
discounting are associated with owing more on a mortgage than the underlying value of the 





seems to decrease the reported intention to default on underwater mortgages even when to do so 
would be financially advantageous.  
 
Modeling Consumer Mortgage Choice 
Mortgages allow consumers to move from rental housing to housing that they will 
eventually own. Standard economics describes the mortgage choice as an optimization problem 
conducted with expectations of future consumption and wealth. For example, Campbell and 
Cocco (2003) model the choice between a fixed rate and an adjustable mortgage for households 
(indexed by j) that maximize an objective function capturing the expected lifetime flow of 
discounted consumption: 
(I-1)         [∑  
    
   
   
     
     
   
   
 
   ],     
subject to household j’s income constraints, an exponential discount rate (), a coefficient of 
relative risk aversion (),  expected consumption amount (C) in each time period (t), and 
terminal real wealth (W).
2
   These are summed over T time periods representing the expected 
lifetime of the individual.  Campbell and Cocco (2011) model mortgage default using a similar 
model.  With exponential discounting and constant relative risk aversion, this functional form is 
typical of standard economic life-cycle models for savings and investing in general, and of 
mortgage choice in particular.   But what if consumers do not use an exponential discount 
function? Based on the growing empirical evidence suggesting non-exponential discounting, a 
quasi-hyperbolic form, provides additional insight into consumer mortgage decision-making.  
                                                          
2
 Campbell and Cocco refer to  and  as  and , respectively, but the variables are labeled differently here 





Experimental studies of time preferences typically present respondents with choices 
between a smaller-sooner reward and a larger-later reward. The choice options are represented as 
(x, t), meaning a reward x that is consumed at time t, or t periods (e.g., days or years) from now. 
The standard model is Discounted Utility, U(x,t) = v(x)d(t), and assumes that the discount 
function, d(t), is exponential.  This assumes the same proportion of x is discounted each time 
period. An alternative, hyperbolic discounting, implies a discount rate decreasing with time, as 
often observed in behavioral studies. The quasi-hyperbolic discount function (QTD, Angeletos et 
al. 2001; Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter 2010; Laibson 1997) mimics a hyperbolic or decreasing 
discount function by placing more weight on the initial period. 
Using the QTD model, time preferences are modeled with the form:  
(I-2)      (   )   ( ) ( )        
 ( )  {
                  
               
}.      
For β < 1, the discount function presents a discontinuous drop at t = 0, which reflects the 
empirical observation that delays diminish a present event’s importance more than delaying 
events at any future t > 0. This represents present bias (O'Donoghue and Rabin 2001).  This 
approach may be extended to other functional forms, but this essay focuses on quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting here for simplicity and ease of measurement.  The discount factor, , corresponds to 
the individuals’ exponential discount rate.   
A hallmark of behaviorally based models of time preference like QTD, is that they 
predict inconsistent choices across time: things that are attractive now, because of present bias, 
are regretted later, and conversely consumers agree to unattractive future outcomes, such as 
increased costs, but because of present bias, find them much more onerous when they come due 





firms could exploit consumers’ QTD preferences by initially pricing low and inflicting heavy 
switching costs as well as back-loading fees (DellaVigna and Malmendier 2004).  Similarly, 
theoretical analysis suggests that given QTD preferences in the credit market, present-biased 
consumers suffer welfare losses after over-borrowing and enthusiastically adopting credit 
arrangements that are inexpensive in the short-run but inflict expensive default penalties 
following inevitable repayment delays (Zauberman 2003; Heidheus and Koszegi 2010).   
This inconsistency has strong implications for dynamic decisions occurring across time. 
DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) examine job search among the unemployed and demonstrate 
analytically that present bias decreases search because the pain is immediate, yet impatience 
increases their likelihood of taking a low paying job, because the long term consequences of 
taking a low wage job are underweighted.   Thus present bias keeps people from searching, but 
when they get an offer, they settle for low wages.  Present bias may also have implications for 
public policy: Paserman (2008), for instance, finds that optimal unemployment benefit and job 
search policy dramatically changes after accounting for present bias, in some cases leading to 
40% changes in policy impact.  
The present research builds on this literature by exploring the effect of present bias and 
an exponential discount rate on decisions that may lead to negative home equity and how these 
factors influence homeowners’ willingness to walk away from a home asset.  Much like the 
literature examining hyperbolic discounting in dynamic decisions, this essay argues that present 
bias and exponential time discounting will have very different effects on these two decisions.
3
  
Recent work also links present bias with overconfidence, in particular with the optimistic 
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 To narrow this essay’s focus, it simplifies one important aspect of time preferences, the behavior of 
‘sophisticated’ present-biased agents who enter into contracts to exert self-control.  Since there does not exist a 






evaluations of future outcomes (Heidhus and Koszegi 2010; see also DellaVigna and 
Malmendier 2006), and liquidity constraints (Meier and Sprenger 2010).  Thus what appears to 
be present bias may be exacerbated or even caused by unseen constraints, rosy predictions of 
future income or exercise behavior.  These issues will all be addressed later through alternate 
model specifications. 
 
Time Preferences, Mortgage Choice, Negative Equity and Strategic Default 
A QTD model suggests that homeowners’ mortgage choices depend on how incentives 
(financial or otherwise) are distributed across time.  This section outlines the specific predictions 
of how time preferences relate with underwater homeownership and strategic default.  It will first 
discuss how present bias (a lower value of β) and exponential discounting (a lower value of δ) 
affect evaluation of mortgage features.  It will then turn to how those mortgage features do not 
share an equal risk that negative housing market shocks will result in negative home equity.  
Finally, it will elaborate on the relationship between time preferences and strategic default.  All 
of these predictions are expanded upon more formally in Appendix I-A. 
 
Time Preferences and Evaluations of Mortgage Features 
A QTD model suggests that more present bias will cause decision-makers to overweight 
consequences in the present relative to those that they expect to occur later.  In particular, those 
with more present bias tend to maximize immediate gains while underweighting future 
consequences such as higher later payments.  For example, present-biased individuals will prefer 






Similarly, differences in discounting as measured by an exponential discount rate (a 
lower value of δ) also affect the attractiveness of mortgage options.  To be more specific about 
the effect of exponential discounting, note that higher discounters will want to accelerate gains 
and delay losses as compared to more patient decision-makers.  Thus, the effect of exponential 
discounting on the attractiveness of a mortgage will depend on the timing and size of the stream 
of gains and losses for the specific mortgage options presented to a consumer.  It will diminish 
the importance of distant-future payments more strongly than near-future payments, specifically, 
by the fraction δ for each year separating the payments.  This can encourage homeowners to 
defer repayment, even in the absence of present bias, if they discount future events by more than 
their expectations about the real interest rate. 
These intuitions about present bias and discounting have implications for mortgage 
choices leading to being underwater.  A logical consequence of appendix equation I-A3 is that, 
in selecting mortgages, both greater present bias and discounting encourage consumers to delay 
payments and to seek larger houses in the immediate and short term in favor of committing to 
making larger payments later.  This leads to Hypothesis I-1: 
 
Hypothesis I-1: Present-biased and exponentially discounting agents (low   and  ) select more 
mortgages that enable them to delay payments than patient agents. For example, agents with 
    or     will back-load mortgages more willingly than agents with        
 
Time Preferences and Underwater Mortgages 
A mortgage is said to be said to be underwater when the mortgage debt exceeds the 





more back-loaded mortgages, at any given point in time they owe more on their mortgage than 
patient homeowners.  Consequently, as negative housing shocks erode property values, the home 
value falls below the mortgage debt of present-biased or exponentially discounting homeowners 
before the home value falls below patient homeowners’ mortgage debt.  Thus homeowners who 
exhibit present bias and exponential discounting are more likely to be underwater.  This is 
Hypothesis I-2. 
 
Hypothesis I-2: The mortgages selected by impatient agents (low   and  ) are more likely to 
become underwater following negative housing market shocks because back-loaded mortgages 
are repaid more slowly than front-loaded mortgages. 
 
Time Preferences and Strategic Default 
As indicated by appendix equation I-A7, present bias and discounting have opposing 
implications for strategic default.  Walking away carries future consequences, such as the loss of 
the residual value of the home after mortgage payments have been made, which discounters find 
less unattractive.  In contrast, present-biased homeowners find staying in the home to be more 
attractive because they overweight negative immediate term consequences (such as social stigma 
and experiencing negative affective reactions of the loss of one’s home) and underweight 
positive medium-term consequences of moving (such as reduced housing payments).  
Consequently, appendix equations I-A4 through I-A8 derive opposite predictions for how present 






Hypothesis I-3: Homeowners who exponentially discount the future more (low  ) are more 
likely to default on their mortgages while present-biased homeowners (low  ) are less likely to 
default. 
 





To examine these questions, this essay analyzes a data set that includes both responses to 
a survey of mortgage holders and market-level real-estate variables provided by commercial 
services. Survey data is increasing being used in the study of consumer finance (Graham and 
Harvey 2001). There are potential problems with framing of survey questions, but survey data 
allows direct assessment of individual-level characteristics such as time preferences and 
knowledge, as well as to measure intentions to walk away from a mortgage.   While alternatives 
exist, such as structural modeling, the levels of negative equity that present in the current 
environment have no equivalent in recent past data.  Any attempt to understand the current crisis 
would have to wait years until the consequences are observed.  Other studies have shown a broad 
effect of measured time preferences on behavior including credit card usage and savings (Meier 
and Sprenger 2010; Chabris et al. 2008; Reimers et al. 2009).  The latter form of data, market-
level real-estate variables, has the advantage of being based on administrative records of actual 







Between April 15, 2010 and May 2, 2010, an Internet survey collected data from 244 
mortgaged US homeowners, of which were 120 underwater and 124 had positive equity.  These 
individuals were drawn from a panel of 44,000 research volunteers maintained by Columbia’s 
Center for Decision Sciences.  By completing a screening questionnaire embedded in other 
studies, 750 potential participants confirmed that they owned a home in the United States and 
had a nonzero mortgage debt.  Five hundred received an invitation to participate in this study.  
Those who indicated that they owed more on their mortgage than the current market value of 
their home were oversampled in order to achieve a roughly even split of underwater and non-
underwater homeowners.  Homeowners answered a series of questions about themselves, their 
home and their financial status.  The survey collected information about individual differences in 
evaluation of prospects, present-biased time preferences, participants’ debt literacy, and 
cognitive reasoning.  Participants were compensated $12 for their time, plus other rewards that 
made the time preference assessment incentive compatible.  
Participants began by reading a passage orienting them to concepts and terminology 
surrounding underwater mortgages and the choice of whether to walk away, which was similar to 
the information commonly available to homeowners through mainstream media sources.  
Specifically, to identify the relationship between time preferences and walkaway choices, 
participants considered a choice between two clear, if simplified, options: (1) moving into a 
rental unit in their area and allowing the bank to foreclose on the house, or (2) staying in their 
current house and continuing mortgage payments. 
 Their answers provided the “walk-away value,” the dollar amount to which the home 





elicited through an adaptive titrator, which asked a series of binary questions about whether the 
respondent would stay or walk away if their home’s market value changed to a specific value 
determined by prior responses.  The titrator was calibrated to each subject’s current home market 
value (as reported at the outset of the survey), and the range of possible walk-away values was 
considered to be between 0 and 120 percent of their current home value (see Guiso et al. 2010 
for a similar measure). In each round, subjects responded with whether they would move out and 
stop paying their mortgage at that home value.  After each round, if they indicated a willingness 
to stay (default) at a particular home value, the ceiling (floor) walk-away value was reduced by 
42% of the range of values.  This process repeated until it achieved sufficient specificity, which 




Respondents then answered a series of questions about their financial position and 
demographic factors, including, age, gender, marital status, number of children, and education. 
Financial factors included employment status, income, monthly mortgage payment, years since 
the home was purchased, current mortgage debt, the initial cost of the home, and their self-
assessment of their underwater status.  Income and monthly mortgage payment were combined 
to produce the share of income servicing the mortgage. While some researchers have expressed 
concerns that individuals cannot recall mortgage details (Bucks and Pence 2008), these 
respondents’ assessment of their home equity and debt were largely internally consistent with 
their other responses in the survey and correlate strongly with zip code-level averages obtained 
from Zillow.com. This data contained average home sale prices at the zip code level both in the 
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 The range constricted by 42% each round to ensure efficient convergence to an individual-level walk-
away price estimate while permitting response uncertainty.  The adaptively elicited value was validated by directly 





year the home was bought (for years since 2000) and around the time of the survey. Mean zip 
code-level home prices correlated 0.47 with respondents’ self-reported home prices.  To further 
ensure data integrity, data were dropped from a limited number of observations that provided 
wildly inconsistent answers to housing equity questions.  Additionally, respondents answered a 
three-item debt literacy scale and financial competency self-assessment of Lusardi and Tufano 
(2009) and a three-item cognitive reflection task (Frederick 2005) and asked about the mortgage 
type. 
At the end of the survey, two adaptive tools enabled estimation of individual-level 
parameters for quasi-hyperbolic time discounting (QTD) (Laibson 1997) (β, δ) and cumulative 
Prospect theory (CPT) (α, λ, σ) (Tversky and Kahnemann 1991; Prelec 1998).   Time preferences 
(β, δ) were estimated with each time period corresponding to a day, so a payment delayed one 
day is diminished by the discount fraction βδ, and a one-week delay induces a discount fraction 
  (   )   For a full discussion of this adaptive, method and its Bayesian estimation procedure, 
including validity checks of the estimation of discounting and Prospect-theory parameters, see 
Toubia et al. (2012).
5
 One in one hundred participants were randomly selected to receive the 
outcome of one of their choices. 
Each segment began with an introduction to the task and a set of questions verifying 
comprehension. To estimate quasi-hyperbolic discounting parameters {β, δ}, subjects chose from 
20 pairs of possible payments at different points in time, in some cases including the present day. 
Similarly, to estimate CPT parameters {α, λ, σ}, respondents reviewed 16 pairs of two outcome 
mixed gambles and asked respondents to indicate their choice. In each case, questions were 
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 Though previous research finds that time preference elicitations risk being confounded with trust in the 
experimenter, there is no reason to suspect that trust in the experimenter would influence relationships between time 





selected adaptively to decrease the variance on estimation of the decision-maker’s vector of 
parameters. To make the individual difference-parameter estimates incentive-compatible, one out 
of every hundred respondents received a supplementary payment corresponding with their 
answer to one of the elicitation questions.  After the task, participants learned whether they were 
selected, and were paid the same day.  Individual-level estimates of quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
and Prospect theory parameters were produced through hierarchical Bayes’ models incorporating 
responses across subjects for each component.
6
  While the parameters β, δ were estimated with 
error terms, only the point estimates (rather than the associated error) were used in subsequent 
analysis. 
 
Control Variables: Risk, Differences in Ability/Knowledge, and Financial Status 
Risk attitude has a central role in standard models of mortgage choice (see equation I-1), 
so assessment of individual attitudes toward risk could be potentially helpful in understanding 
mortgage choice.  It has also been argued that the observed high levels of discounting may be 
related to high levels of risk aversion (Andersen et al. 2008). The present research assesses risk 
preferences and time preferences simultaneously, allowing the results to control, for example, the 
degree of risk aversion in looking at the effects of time preferences as well as observing direct 
effects of risk attitude upon mortgage choice and abandonment.  
This essay uses a standard Prospect-theory framework and the probability-weighting 
function proposed by Prelec (1998) with a set of adaptively generated options. Value for a choice 
option is described by three parameters {α, σ, λ}, which capture, respectively, the distortion 
(nonlinear sensitivity) of the probabilities, the curvature (sensitivity) of the value function, and 
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 The fit of the QTD model was compared to both a hyperbolic and an exponential model to respondents’ 





loss aversion.   Genovese and Mayer (2001) demonstrate the importance of loss aversion in real-
estate decisions. 
There has been an increasing interest in the impact of cognitive and knowledge 
differences on consumer financial decisions. This essay uses measures of cognitive reflection 
(Frederick 2005) to assess cognitive ability. 
Another source of differences in ability is preexisting knowledge.  Lusardi and Tufano 
(2009), among others, have documented large differences in financial and debt literacy, relating 
them to the quality of financial decisions that people make.  The current study uses Lusardi and 
Tufano’s (2009) measure of debt literacy as a control. 
Mortgage choice will also be affected by individual differences in economic status such 
as income and credit status.  It is also quite plausible that economic status could be determined 
by time preferences.  Analysis will therefore control for these variables in relating time 
preferences to being underwater or intentions to abandon a mortgage.  
 
Market-Level Variables 
In addition to individual characteristics, market-level outcomes affect being underwater 
and walking away.  Two sources of data control for market-level shocks.  The first, provided by 
Zillow.com, contains estimates of the current median home price, the price when the home was 
purchased, and its price at the peak of the market at the level of each homeowner’s zip code.  
Zillow prices have been widely used by real estate economists (e.g. Mian and Sufi 2009).  To 
control for current market-level conditions at the zip code level, BlackBox Logic LLC provided 
the percentage of homes that are currently being foreclosed, and the percentage that are involved 





2000 and 2009.  For both data sets, there were occasions (respectively, 25 and 7 percent) when 
zip code data were not available.  In these cases, missing zip code data was replaced by available 
state-level data, which had a high correlation with zip code-level data.
7
  To summarize, 
differences in individual level time preferences are examined as correlates of the type of 
mortgage selected, the likelihood that a mortgage is “underwater,” and the likelihood of 
defaulting on an underwater mortgage.  In particular, the a greater degree of “present bias” in 
time preferences is hypothesized to be associated with more back-loaded mortgages, greater 




The results are organized as follows: First basic statistics for the measures are presented. 
After discussing the analysis strategy, the first essay’s first research question is addressed: What 
is the relationship between present bias and exponential discounting and a number of precursors 
to underwater status, such as a household taking an adjustable-rate mortgage?   Then this essay 
examines the characteristics of a decision-maker that leads them to be underwater. The focus is 
on time preferences but also controls for value and risk, cognitive abilities and knowledge, and 
various demographic variables. Finally, time preference and other factors are related to 
underwater homeowners’ willingness to walk away from paying their mortgage.  The validity of 
the measures of underwater status are examined closely, as well as the effects of alternative 
specifications of present bias, and alternative explanations of the results are discussed.  
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 Correlations between state- and zip code-level data were, respectively, 0.59 for Zillow.com data, 0.78 for 
BlackBox foreclosure data, and 0.51 for BlackBox short sale data.  The analysis excludes a few subjects who 






Table I-1 provides descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviations) for the measures.
8
  
It is separated for each group of measures by mortgage equity status.  People classified as 
underwater owe, on average, $14,368 on their home more than its current value, or are 
approximately 5.3 percent underwater.  In contrast, positive equity homeowners’ homes are 
valued at $110,474 (38%) more than their debt.
9
  Time preference, value, and risk parameters are 
comparable to prior studies using different, non-adaptive techniques and different samples (see 
Toubia et al. (2012) for a more extensive discussion). To compare the sample from the study 
with the larger population of US homeowners, the respondents were compared to a 
representative sample of US households gathered in 2010 by a market research company, 
Strategic Business Insights (SBI). SBI’s MacroMonitor survey is, in turn, validated through the 
Survey of Consumer Finances and the Flow of Funds report by the US Federal Reserve's Board 
as well as internal wave-to-wave validation.  The characteristics of the sample from the study 
were compared to those from the SBI sample that carry mortgage debt.  The final column of 
Table I-1 suggests that the sample is reasonably similar to the nationally representative sample.  
The two have similar home values, but the SBI respondents have smaller mortgages, have owned 
their homes longer, are older, are less educated and have greater loss aversion.  These differences 
may have resulted because SBI over-sampled affluent households while the present study over-
sampled underwater homeowners and was conducted online
10
.  
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 Descriptions, sources and levels of all variables are contained in Table I-A1.  Table I-A2 contains a 
correlation matrix of the main variables of interest.   Both of these matrices appear in Appendix I-B. 
9
 The asymmetry in net home equity position among underwater and positive-equity homeowners may 
reflect, in part, that homeowners tend to become underwater only through negative housing market shocks, while 
homeowners can gain positive equity both by positive housing market shocks and through years of mortgage 
payments. 
10
 The differences in loss aversion between the samples may be because SBI calculated loss aversion alone 
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  B. Real Estate Characteristics 
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  C. Time Discounting and Prospect Theory Risk Parameters 
  β: lower values suggest more    
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  λ: Higher values mean more  
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  D. Knowledge / Cognitive Resources 






















The present research is interested in how time preferences have separate influences on 
mortgage choices related to underwater status and the decision to strategically default on the 
mortgage.  The estimation challenge is that home equity position is related to underwater status 
and is a strong predictor of strategic mortgage abandonment.  Since home equity status 
influences willingness to walk away, two simultaneous equations were estimated using the three-
stage least squares procedure developed by Zellner and Thiel (1962).
11
  This provided an 
estimate of the relationship between time preferences and underwater status, and independently 
of home equity position, the relationship between time preferences and walking away.  The 
reduced-form equations characterizing the mortgage choices leading to underwater status and 
willingness to walk away for individual i, are: 
(I-3)                                                 
(I-4)                                                     
                        
In other words, an individual homeowner’s underwater status,              is a 
function of present bias (  ) and exponential discounting (  ), while the homeowner’s 
willingness to walk away is a function of their time preferences and their degree of positive or 
negative equity.  Note that            and            are expanded forms of            , 
focusing respectively on the amount of home value in excess of, or shortfall relative to mortgage 
debt.  Consequently, error terms     and     are correlated, and as     influences            , 
under simple OLS regression,            and            are not independent of    .  
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 Independent OLS regressions are not appropriate as the residual from equation I-3is a significant 
predictor if inserted into equation I-4  (p<0.03).   The 3SLS estimates are not materially different from seemingly 





Consequently, OLS regression would produce biased estimates and the equations were estimated 
simultaneously through 3SLS. 
The simplest model simultaneously estimates the relationships between the individual 
time preferences (   and   ) and the endogeneous mortgage factors,             and  
         .  As there are at least as many factors exogenous to the model as endogenous factors 
being estimated,             and           are identifiable.  
The relationship between present bias, exponential discounting, underwater status and 
walking away were further tested by adding additional control variables to the model.  Both 
individual difference survey items and independent data on zipcode-level local real estate factors 
are added successively to each equation.  These alternate specifications provide more 
information to identify the endogenous factors while also helping to address alternate accounts of 
the relationships found. 
All successive equations control for local real estate fluctuations and liquidity constraints 
that limit the individual’s available options.  For this equation I-3 the fractional change in local 
housing prices and mortgage burden to the household’s budget.  Similarly in all cases, equation 
I-4 includes local real estate foreclosure and short sale trends and mortgage burden.  Beyond 
these additional controls added to all models, Model 2 includes mortgage year intercepts in both 
equations, while Model 3 considers debt literacy as a precursor to underwater status as well as 
social and moral considerations in the decision to walk away.  Model 4 examines the potential 
confounding effects of risk preferences in each equation, while Model 5 includes employment 
security and cognitive reasoning in each equation, plus expectations about and confidence in the 





simultaneously estimated equations testing the relationship between time preferences and both 
mortgage choices. 
 
Antecedents to Underwater Status and Time Preferences 
First Hypothesis I-1 is tested to examine the direct effect of time preferences upon 
mortgage choice.  These choices are examined separately from the simultaneous estimation 
framework because the data contain only self-reports of these decisions and do not have 
contemporaneous market level controls.  The existence of a relationship will be intriguing, but 
will be subjected to a more rigorous analysis with the tests of Hypotheses I-2 and I-3.  This 
section will overview the relationship between time preferences and the mortgage choices that 
leave homeowners more at risk of negative home equity following housing shocks.  It will first 
explore these relationships among the sample of mortgaged homeowners, and then turn to similar 
analyses among a nationally representative sample. 
Survey of Mortgaged Homeowners. Hypothesis I-1 suggests that mortgage-related 
decisions involving the acceleration of benefits and the delay of costs will be associated with 
present bias.  Respondents reported how much of the cost of their home was borrowed, whether 
they had a fixed or adjustable mortgage, a second mortgage, and the size of their burden of 
mortgage debt relative to their income.  While these data lack the market level controls needed 
for modeling these decisions jointly with subsequent decisions, an examination of these self-
reports of past decisions is instructive. 
Present bias is linked with several precursors to negative home equity, as shown in Table 
I-2. Homeowners with stronger present bias are more likely to have borrowed a larger portion of 





Stronger present bias also is associated with a greater likelihood of having a second mortgage on 
the home (p=0.034), and with spending a larger fraction of income paying the mortgage 
(p=0.035). In contrast, exponential time discounting is generally unrelated to the underwater 
antecedents (p’s > 0.15). 
Nationally Representative Sample. A similar analysis on SBI’s nationally representative 
MacroMonitor data set provides further evidence about the relationship between time  
Table I-2. Antecedents to Negative Home Equity and Intertemporal Preferences 
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(regression) 
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Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.043 0.050 0.041 0.011 
Resid. Std. Error 0.261 0.375 0.460 0.144 
Observations 244 244 244 239 




















Adjusted/Pseudo R2  0.012 0.009 0.009 
Resid. Std. Error  0.241 0.295 0.172 
Observations  1992 2257 2201 






preferences and the precursors to negative home equity.  While the survey does not decompose 
time preferences into present bias and discount rates, it does allow one to estimate each 
respondent’s yearly discount fraction based on his or her hypothetical choices between $100 
today and various sums ($110, $125, $150, $175, $200, $225) in twelve months.  Since the 
present research suggests that these parameters have the similar effects on mortgage choice, this 
hypothesis can be tested with this single parameter.  Each respondent’s yearly discount fraction 
was estimated based on the rate corresponding with the midpoint between the smallest delayed 
payment accepted and largest delayed payment rejected.  A series of survey-weighted and 
logistic regressions and logistic regressions were run to assess the relationship between this 
estimate of impatience and the underwater precursors.  The data suggests that impatience 
predicts having an adjustable interest rate (p=0.01), having a second mortgage (p<0.05) and 
paying a larger share of income toward the mortgage (p<0. 01).
12
  
As a robustness check, additional models added a series of controls to the analysis of the 
SBI data.  The first model controlled for loss aversion.  The second controlled for demographic 
factors including income, marital status, gender, age and education.  The third controlled for 
measures of liquidity including checking account balance, savings account balance and credit 
card balance, each as a fraction of income.  A final model controlled for all of these factors.  The 
relationship between impatience and the precursors were generally robust to these controls, 
directionally consistent and approximately similar in size.  The only measures that did not retain 
usual levels of statistical significance (p<0.05) was the relationship between second mortgages 
and impatience controlling for demographic factors which remained directionally consistent and 
marginally significant.  One other caveat is that there was an interaction between income and 
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 It was not possible to assess whether impatience predicts the fraction of the home cost borrowed because 





impatience in predicting the share of income spent on the mortgage suggesting that this particular 
finding is restricted to the lower income range (income<$50,000).  The SBI data set further 
indicates that impatience predicts net home equity among all homeowners (p<0.0001), a result 
that retained usual significance after accounting for all controls.
13
  All other tests suggest, 
consistent with the survey, and with Hypothesis I-1, that the impatience predicts precursors to 
negative home equity. 
 
Underwater Status and Time Preferences 
Estimating the effects of time preferences upon both underwater status and mortgage 
abandonment presents several challenges.  Two outcomes were modeled:  The first, contained in 
Hypothesis I-2, is the impact of prior mortgage choice on current equity in the home; the second, 
consistent with Hypothesis I-3 is the intention to walk away.  Since current mortgage status will 
influence the intention to walk away, the present research simultaneously estimates equations 
modeling both decisions.  That is achieved through a three-stage least-squares regression 
(Zellner and Theil 1962), which simultaneously estimates the relationship between time 
preferences and underwater status as well as between time preferences and walking away 
(controlling for home equity status).  Analysis with OLS regressions revealed similar 
relationships between time preferences and all the outcome measures.    
Because market-level real estate shocks to individual financial status also influence 
consumer mortgage outcomes, the analysis also considers self-reports of liquidity.  This control 
suggests that observed relationships between time preferences and underwater status are not 
artifacts of short-term financial constraints caused by the home equity outcomes. Finally the 
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 Appendix I-C contains further analysis of the relationship between intertemporal preferences and net 





robustness of the results were tested by adding additional controls to the model, including social 
and moral factors, risk preferences, loss aversion and probability distortion as characterized by 
Prospect theory, and financial literacy. 
While Table I-1 shows simple differences in time preference between underwater and 
positive-equity mortgagers, consistent with Hypothesis I-2, Table I-3 presents the results of the 
three-stage least-squares analyses of underwater status with various controls.  Model 1 indicates 
that homeowners with strong present bias (lower β) or who underweight outcomes in future time 
periods (lower δ) are more underwater. This result persists after accounting for the effects of 
several descriptors of individuals’ economic condition, knowledge and skill, and other 
preferences as well as market-level events. In the following regressions (see Table I-3), all 
continuous covariates are mean-centered. 
Model 2 and those that follow add two controls. The first, based on data provided by 
Zillow.com, employs a variable representing zip code-specific real estate market change in price 
since the property’s peak estimated value.  This controls for the possibility that the time 
preference effects are confounded with the choice of the houses or neighborhood or other 
possible relationships.  As expected, this has a significant effect on being underwater.  Similarly, 
entering the proportion of income servicing the mortgage (based upon the respondent’s answers 
to income and mortgage payment questions) is a significant predictor of being underwater, with 
those devoting more of their income to servicing the mortgage more likely to be underwater. 
This controls for the liquidity of the household.  It might be that households that are strapped for 
cash become present-biased or that time preferences influence other financial choices that 
constrain the range of mortgage choices available to the household.   However, both present bias 





Table I-3. Which Homeowners Are Underwater? 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
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R-sq 0.0921 0.2573 0.1667 0.1562 0.1679 
N 226 215 215 206 215 
Each column contains 3SLS regression coefficients simultaneously estimated with walk-away 
model, with standard errors in parentheses.   *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; † p<0.10.  
 
time preferences matter independent of real estate choice and financial demands of the mortgage.  
Additionally, this model includes fixed effects for each purchase year, which rules out a 
confound between mortgage year in the relationship between time preferences and underwater 
status. 
Model 3 controls for knowledge about debt, a variable shown to predict the cost of credit 





adds the three Prospect-theory variables to Model 2 and shows that loss aversion, diminishing 
sensitivity, and probability distortion do not relate to being underwater.  Finally Model 5 controls 
for a questionnaire-based measure of the ability to suppress impulsive answers, the Cognitive 
Reflection Task (CRT), and for self-reported employment security to control for optimism in 
future income.  None of these controls are related to being underwater.  The CRT result is 
particularly important, since CRT is associated with discounting in other studies (Frederick 
2005). 
Together, these analyses suggest that: 1) both measures of time preference predict 
underwater status, with more present bias and more exponential time discounting associated with 
being underwater; 2) this result is likely not driven by the other variables related to the real estate 
and constraints that may be affected by or affect intertemporal discounting; and 3) the finding is 
robust after controlling for preferences, including risk aversion, non-linearity in probabilities, 
and loss aversion, and for differences in abilities, optimism and knowledge.  
 
Walking Away and Time Preferences  
The second part of the simultaneous estimation explores the factors that explain 
underwater homeowners’ willingness to walk away from paying their mortgage.  Respondents 
reported the price they believed that their home could be sold for in the current housing 
conditions.
14
  Subjects reported whether they would continue to pay their mortgage given that 
their home value declined from this value.  In this context, willingness to stay is the size of the 
further decrease in the resale price of the home, a negative amount, at which the homeowner 
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measures were not significantly different (difference = $2,382, two-tailed t(166)=0.1366, p=0.89).  This suggests the 





would continue to pay the mortgage.  Hence, when this measure has a slightly negative value, a 
homeowner is quite willing to walk away.  A more negative value corresponds with a greater 
willingness to stay.  Thus this measure increases with willingness to walk away. 
Recall that Hypothesis I-3 suggested that more present-biased individuals would be less 
likely to walk away because the immediate costs of walking away loom large, while individuals 
who exponentially discount the future more would be more likely to walk away because the 
residual value of the home is not as important as avoiding the intervening mortgage payments.  
The model suggests that there exists a range of mortgage payments where both occur, 
specifically, when the monthly mortgage exceeds the price of an equivalent rental by an amount 
between a fraction of the short-term moving costs and the full short-term moving cost.  Table I-4 
summarizes five versions of the simultaneous estimation that demonstrate that present bias and 
exponential discounting have opposite relationships with walking way intentions.  These are 
again robust to the determinants of risk aversion and relevant demographic, economic, and 
market-level controls. 
All models estimate separate coefficients for positive and negative equity, since negative 
equity might have a greater impact on walking away.  Model 1 reports these coefficients as well 
as coefficients for present bias and exponential discounting.  In this specification, present bias 
and heavy exponential discounting of future periods have opposite effects on willingness to walk 
away in response to.  Present bias is associated with greater willingness to stay in a home that is 
further underwater (p=0.026), while the discount fraction is associated with greater willingness 
to walk away (p=0.023).  This predicted relationship in the opposite direction occurs despite the 
positive (.54) correlation between the two components of time preference and reflects the 





Table I-4. Reservation Price for Walking Away 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 








































































































Employment Security     
-13,841* 
(6,954) 
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R-sq 0.0957 0.2203 0.1373 0.1643 0.1599 
N 226 215 215 206 215 
Each column contains 3SLS regression coefficients simultaneously estimated with underwater 






the unfortunate financial position) and advantages to defaulting in the relatively near future (e.g. 
lower rent).  While sizable, this correlation allows the estimation of separate effects for the two 
components of time preference.  As might be expected, the slight tendency for present bias and 
exponential time discounting to have opposite effects on walking away is increased when the 
effect is jointly estimated, as in the first regression. 
Model 2 controls for possible market-level differences in housing prices and banking 
policies, using the proportion of the zip code’s housing that are currently in short sale, and the 
fraction in foreclosure.  In addition, Model 2 controls for financial constraints by including the 
proportion of the homeowner’s income servicing the mortgage.  Both zip code-level variables are 
related to intention to walk away.  Notably, the regression coefficients on these variables suggest 
that homeowners are more likely to continue paying in zip codes with more foreclosures, and 
more likely to walk away in zip codes with more short sales (which generally comprise a smaller 
fraction of homes).  Finally, Model 2 also includes mortgage year controls, suggesting that the 
intention to walk away is not driven by when the home and mortgage were selected.  However, 
the effects of present bias and exponential time discounting remain significant and largely 
unchanged. 
Model 3 adds a measure of the perceived morality of walking away and a measure of the 
social distance between the homeowner and someone who has strategically defaulted to capture 
social contagion (White 2010; Guiso et al. 2010). Neither variable is significantly related to 
intention to walk away. Model 4 included, instead, the individual-level Prospect-theory 
parameters. This revealed a marginal and unexpected result that more loss-averse people are 
marginally more likely to walk away, but the effects of present bias and exponential time 





Finally, Model 5 assesses an alternate explanation that overconfidence in the local 
housing market discourages walking away future income similarly to how overconfidence in 
future income may encourage excessive borrowing.  Browning and Tobacman (2007) note that 
choices motivated by time preferences can at times be indistinguishable from optimism about 
future income and income smoothing by time-consistent homeowners.  This account would 
predict that employment security, and expectations about and confidence in the local housing 
market, which are negatively related to walking away, would fully account for the effect of time 
preferences on walking away.  Controlling for these factors
15
, along with the unrelated Cognitive 
Reflection Task, both present bias and discounting remain significant predictors of walking 
away. 
In sum, the results suggest that time preferences, in addition to being linked to 
underwater status, are linked with willingness to walk away from one’s mortgage.  Unlike with 
underwater status, present bias and exponential discounting have opposing relationships with 
walking away, despite a high positive correlation between present bias and exponential time 
discounting. These results are not explained by the local housing environment, liquidity 
constraints, components of risk aversion, cognitive reasoning ability, debt literacy, nor other 
demographic controls. 
 
Robustness Checks and Alternate Explanations 
Validation of Underwater Status 
One concern is that many of the measures involve self-reports.  While it might be 
preferable to employ archival data for some measures, they are not always preferable, nor are the 
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self-reports necessarily flawed.  First, it could be argued that it is the perception of financial 
states rather than the states themselves that might drive decisions.  Second, the measures of 
underwater status seem both reliable and valid.  During the prequalification survey and again 
during the main survey, subjects were asked to assess whether they owed more in mortgage debt 
than the current market value of their home.  Sixty percent of respondents gave exactly the same 
rating on a 5-point scale, and the two ratings had a 0.76 correlation (Cronbach’s α = 0.865). 
These ratings were averaged for the measure. 
 
Alternate Specifications of Present Bias and Underwater Status 
As present bias (1-β) is skewed (see histograms of time preferences in Figure I-A1 of 
Appendix I-B), additional analysis explores the robustness of the findings to three alternative 
specifications of present bias.  Each regression described in Table I-3 is replicated under each of 
the following specifications: 
1. Median Split: β=0.94 
2. 75%–25% Split: β=0.86 
3. Logit Transformation: β/(1-β) 
These analyses produce estimates for present bias that are in the same direction and 
largely possess similar levels of significance. The only exception, given the loss of information, 
is the median split, which shows somewhat less significant results.  
The regressions in Table I-4 were replicated, restricting the analysis to underwater 
homeowners. Despite the restricted sample size (110), each regression replicates the opposing 





Finally the analysis investigated one alternative explanation of the link between 
intertemporal preferences and underwater mortgages.  Perhaps banks approved loans less 
prudently in the years immediately preceding the peak in housing prices and made loans to 
people with different time preferences, so that the results suggest differences in bank policy and 
not a difference in mortgage choice resulting from present bias and exponential discounting.  
However, the data do not support this explanation.  Regressing years since purchase on 
intertemporal preference parameters, there is no relationship.  To control for any year effects, 
which might differentially impacting households who mortgaged under different policy regimes, 
Model 2 of Tables I-3 and I-4 include and exclude yearly fixed effects.  While this does increase 
the model fit significantly, including or excluding the year effects does not substantially change 
the relationship between time preference and having an underwater mortgage, or with 
willingness to walk away.  This suggests that while there is year-to-year variation in the 
relationship between being year, mortgage balances and intent to strategic default, these effects 
are independent of time preferences.  
 
Time Preferences, Liquidity and Mortgage Choice 
 Finally, analysis further explores the relationship between liquidity constraints, 
intertemporal preferences and mortgage choices.  There are two alternate explanations involving 
liquidity constraints that compete with the hypothesis that intertemporal preferences directly 
influence mortgage choices and defaulting behaviors.  One possibility is that the measurements 
of intertemporal preferences expressed by participants are conflated with their preexisting 
liquidity constraints.  Another possibility is that intertemporal preferences could influence 





further influence mortgage choices.  Both of these competing hypotheses are tested through a 
final series of simultaneous regressions that explore the relationship between intertemporal 
preferences, liquidity and walking away. 
In particular, the analysis assess whether liquidity confounds or mediates the relationship 
between intertemporal preferences and walking away by adding fraction of income servicing 
mortgage (inverse liquidity) as an additional endogenous factor to Models 2-5.  In each case, in 
addition to estimating the relationship between intertemporal preferences and underwater 
homeownership (equation I-3) as well as with walking away (equation I-4), a modified model 
also simultaneously estimated the relationship between intertemporal preferences and income 
servicing mortgage (inverse liquidity), equation I-5: 
(I-5)                                                        
The model also included appropriate covariates predicting income servicing mortgage in 
each model.  In the modified models (Models 2a-5a), underwater mortgages and walking away 
were as specified in Models 2-5, and income servicing mortgage was an endogeneously 
determined function of present bias and exponential discounting, along with (Model 2a) purchase 
year fixed effects, (Model 3a) debt literacy, (Model 4a) Prospect theory parameters, and (Model 
5a) employment security, and cognitive reasoning. 
In each model, the data suggests that liquidity constraints do not account for the 
relationship between intertemporal preferences and walking away.  After accounting for 
endogenously determined income servicing mortgage (inverse liquidity) the relationship between 
present bias, exponential discounting underwater status and walking away are unchanged, in 
significance and magnitude, from relationships when liquidity is assumed to be exogeneous.  The 





direction of its coefficient indicates that increasing liquidity corresponds with increased 
willingness to default.  Income servicing mortgage, in general, increases with present bias and 
decreases with exponential discounting (all ps < 0.10), except in model 3a, which accounts for 
debt literacy.  In other words, liquidity decreases with present bias and increases with 
exponential discounting.  Since willingness to walk away increases with liquidity, the 
relationship between time preferences and liquidity is directionally consistent with the 
relationship between time preferences and walking away.  Yet even while intertemporal 
preferences consistently predicting liquidity and walking away, the relationship between 





Mortgage choice and abandonment of a mortgage are both decisions with important 
consequences for the consumer, lenders, and the state of the economy more generally. Mortgage 
decisions are also prototypical of many consumer financial choices that that involve a stream of 
expenditures and consumption occurring across time. This essay focuses on using heterogeneity 
in time preferences, particularly a present bias, to explain a sequence of decisions concerning 
mortgages, the selection of a mortgage that may lead to having negative equity, and the decision 
to abandon a mortgage.  
In mortgage choice consumers with stronger present bias are more likely to have 
borrowed a larger portion of the cost of their home, are more likely to have an adjustable-





consumers who weight immediate outcomes more heavily or are more present-biased are more 
likely to be “underwater” with their mortgages.  Similarly, those who discount the future more 
are also more likely to be underwater.  Furthermore, the findings do not appear to be driven by 
the “reverse” effect of underwater status on intertemporal discounting, nor by changes in the 
stringency of mortgage standards.  Finally, the importance of modeling present bias and discount 
rate for future incomes separately is illustrated by the analysis of walking away from a mortgage.  
Here present bias and discount rates work, as predicted, in opposite directions.  Because the costs 
of abandoning a mortgage are mostly in the near term, present-biased households are more likely 
to continue paying a mortgage, even when there is negative equity.  In contrast, more discounting 
of the future, beyond the present (i.e., exponential discounting), was associated with a greater 
willingness to walk away. 
The findings are robust to the inclusion of several controls for preferences including 
consumer differences in probability weighting, sensitivity to value changes, and loss aversion.  In 
addition, the findings are robust to other individual differences in debt literacy, cognitive 
reasoning, liquidity constraints, and demographic factors. 
 
Caveats and Future Research 
Using behavioral models of time preference is a growing area of research in consumer 
finance.  Yet the initial efforts to understand mortgage decisions are just a beginning.  The 
analysis makes significant use of non-monetary costs such as moving and search costs, and 
emotional attachment to the neighborhood.  It does not, however, explicitly measure these.  
Similarly, the method discussed here measures preferences for money over time and risk but 





that is common to most research using the concept of present bias:  When is exactly “Now”?  In 
the model, obviously moving into or out of a home does not happen immediately. More complete 
accounts of time preference should address these questions. 
Another concern is reverse causality:  Diminished resources may change respondents’ 
time preferences.  While the analysis controls for financial circumstances in some of the 
estimation procedures, and while the ability to control against immediate temptations seems to 
have a stable component over periods of at least a decade (Eigsti et al. 2006), future research 
should still examine the relationship between trait-like time preferences and short term changes 
in circumstances.  In the current application, however, it seems unlikely that such an explanation 
would easily explain why present bias both increases the tendency to be underwater and the 
opposite effect of decreasing tendency to the walk away.  Similarly, this explanation cannot 
easily explain the opposite relationships of present bias and exponential discounting with 
willingness to walk away.  This account is also not supported in the supplementary analysis with 
endogenous liquidity.  Broadly, one might be concerned that a third factor drives mortgage 
choices and incidentally correlates with both present bias and exponential discounting.  While 
this possibility is not completely ruled out, such an account must account for these distinctive 
reversals. 
Note also that traditional economic models assume exponential discounting and 
integration over all future time periods.  In contrast, the approach assumes that consumers may 
treat periods separately.  This is consistent with the notion made popular by the term “mental 
accounting” (Thaler and Johnson 1990, Thaler 1999), suggesting that not all expenditures are 





narrowly (Read, Loewenstein and Rabin 1999).   However, more research is needed to 
understand the representation used by consumers when faced with these choices. 
Similarly, the present analysis assumes that homeowners are unsophisticated and do not 
anticipate their future impatience as discussed by O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) and others.  In 
other words, the analysis supposes that homeowners are, in this context, naive in their time 
preferences.  While the results are consistent with models of consumers who tend to repay more 
slowly than they expect, such as in Heidhuis and Kosegi (2010), future work might consider the 
mortgage choices given varying levels of homeowner sophistication.  
Finally, the present findings might appear to endorse the view that time preferences have 
an almost trait-like status, potentially being a stable individual difference that can be used to 
predict a wide range of complex financial behaviors, such as work linking experimentally 
elicited time preferences with real-world credit (Meier and Sprenger 2011) and savings (Ashraf, 
Karlan and Yin 2006, Tanaka; Camerer and Nguyen 2010).  This view is further supported by 
work in decision neuroscience suggesting that intertemporal choices are related to systematic 
differences in activation of specific regions, notably the ventral striatum (Kable and Glimcher 
2007).  There is in fact some controversy about whether present bias and discounting over other 
periods of time involve separate neural systems (McClure et al. 2007; McClure et al. 2004).  In 
support of a multiple-systems account there is evidence that the temporary impairment of the left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex can markedly increase present bias (Figner et al. 2010). 
However, despite convincing evidence that intertemporal choice involves neural 
substrates, present bias and exponential time discounting – parameterized here as 1-β and 1-δ, 
might also be seen as convenient summaries of more complex cognitive processes because they 





observation that discount rates differ across quantities (Chapman 1996), and that discount rates 
differ markedly across response modes such as decisions to accelerate or delay consumption 
(Loewenstein 1988; Weber et al. 2007), or have other context dependent components.  
Such a constructive process view suggests possible interventions, particularly combined 
with the observation that present bias has different roles in mortgage choice and in walking 
away. In particular, individuals seem to be making decisions that, when viewed jointly, may be 
problematic. In the first case, overweighting short-term benefits leads them to make mortgage 
choices that put them at great risk of being underwater and perhaps foreclosure.  In the second, 
they are unlikely to walk away from that mortgage, despite the economic incentives to do so. 
Both decisions might benefit from the suggestion that decision-makers “frame the future first,” 
by framing intertemporal choices as decisions in an accelerate frame (Weber et al. 2007).  This 
intervention might help this at-risk group to avoid bad mortgages in the first place, and to walk 
away if warranted. 
One consulting firm, the Loan Value Group, has recently marketed a product to banks to 
convince homeowners not to walk away (Loan Value Group 2010).  Their enticement?  Money 
would be given to the homeowner when the mortgage is paid off (RHReward.com 2010).  If the 
analysis is correct that underwater homeowners have both greater present bias and a tendency to 
discount the future, this intervention is misguided, since they are the people least likely to be 
persuaded by distant payoffs. A more effective strategy, the present research suggests, is a small 
immediate payoff when each payment is made. 
Additionally, the analysis in Essay I suggests that there are strong practical applications 
of the time preference elicitation procedure developed by Toubia et al. (2012).  For example, the 





time preferences.  Given this new source of information, marketers and policymakers could 
design financial products and market interventions with intertemporal incentive structures based 
on a better understanding of time preferences provided by the elicitation method. 
To conclude, the analysis of mortgage choice and abandonment suggests principles that 
can be applied to many consumer decisions that, in economics, would be the province of life-
cycle models.  The results suggest that ideas that are central to marketing, segmentation and 
individual differences particularly when applied to the behavioral economic concepts of present 
bias and personal discount rates would help one understand a broad range of behaviors in 
consumer financial decisions.  These include balancing savings and retirement across the 



















Previous research has shown that periodic pricing (i.e., reframing a single payment as a 
series of payments over time) can increase a consumer's willingness to purchase by making the 
cost of purchase seem trivial.  This essay presents evidence that triviality is neither a necessary 
nor sufficient condition for periodic pricing to increase willingness to purchase, and it expands 
the domain of situations where periodic pricing increases purchase.  This essay proposes that 
periodic pricing amplifies consumers’ perceptions of a contract’s benefits and presents evidence 
that periodic pricing can be effective even in cases where each payment is not trivial.  Evidence 
from five studies suggests that scope-insensitivity plays an important role in this effect.  
 
Introduction 
 Marketers have considerable flexibility with how to present prices in ongoing consumer 
relationships involving contracts. They can present the cost of a subscription, for example, as a 
single, aggregate price (e.g., $250 a year), or reframe it as a series of periodic payments over 
time (e.g., 69¢ per day). In many cases, consumers evaluate the offer more positively if it is 
framed in terms of a number of smaller, periodic payments. This tendency has been called the 
“pennies-a-day effect” in previous research (Gourville 1998, 1999, 2003). 
 The current essay supplements and extends this model by investigating how such periodic 
pricing influences how consumers represent the intangible rewards associated with payment—a 
topic that is not well-understood.  For example, when a nonprofit reframes a single yearly 
donation as a series of daily payments, it is not well understood how this reframing impacts the 
satisfaction a donor receives from, say, providing resources to feed hungry children.  On a larger 





when they convert its total price into monthly payments or its daily equivalent.  This essay 
explores when and how periodic pricing (e.g. per-day price framing), encourages consumers to 
inflate the benefits associated with expenditures. It reports results from five studies suggesting 
that consumers often respond better to a periodic payment plan than to an aggregate price. 
 In what follows, this essay proposes that periodic pricing affects how consumers think 
about the benefits associated with a contract.  In particular, it will provide evidence that periodic 
pricing encourages consumers to focus on a particularly salient subset of the benefits the contract 
offers, and generalize evaluations of this subset to the full set of benefits provided by the 
contract.  For example, when considering whether to agree to a lease of a sports car priced on a 
daily basis, a consumer will think about the benefits they will experience on the peak experience 
days and generalize that experience to more mundane days of the lease.  In contrast, if the lease 
is priced on a yearly basis, the consumer will think about the benefits they will experience 
throughout the year.  Overall evaluations of the contract’s benefits are more favorable under 
periodic pricing when consumers are more likely to respond to the presence or absence of the 
contract’s benefit than its magnitude. That is, propose that periodic pricing is most effective 
when consumers are scope insensitive to the contract’s benefits. 
 In five studies, this essay proposes and shows that periodic pricing alters how consumers 
evaluate a contract’s benefits, and that this explains when periodic pricing encourages consumers 
to agree to contracts.  It will demonstrate that this novel account of periodic pricing enables per-
day pricing to be effective even for non-trivial prices and is not explained by diminished cost 







Revisiting Periodic Pricing 
 Previous research has suggested that reframing a cost as a series of small payments 
makes offers more attractive because consumers view the cost as trivial, similar to other routine 
expenses that fail to give consumers pause, like buying a cup of coffee (Gourville 1998, 1999, 
2003).  This essay supplements and extends this research, finding that periodic pricing 
encourages people to imagine the per-period (e.g. daily) benefits of their purchases while 
aggregate pricing encourages them to evaluate the contract’s aggregate benefit.  For example, a 
dollar-per-day donation request evokes thoughts about how one would impact a starving child on 
that day, and then generalizes that impression across all days, while a $365/year request evokes 
thoughts about a year of helping.  This essay finds that, in many cases, periodic pricing can 
increase how consumers perceive the anticipated benefits of each dollar spent.  Importantly, this 
suggests a process through which periodic pricing can increase purchase intentions for non-
trivial costs and carries implications for the conditions when pricing on a periodic basis most 
encourages purchase. 
 Both the pennies-a-day model and the new perspective offered here are consistent with 
the view that consumers do not spontaneously combine gains or losses
16
 (e.g., convert a daily 
price to an annual price; Thaler and Johnson 1990; Linville and Fischer 1991), a pattern that has 
been called the “concreteness principle.” The pennies-a-day model and the present framework 
are complementary examples of this principle in that both find that consumers tend to interpret 
the deal as it is framed for them (Slovic 1972; Read et al. 1999).  Just as the pennies-a-day 
literature finds that costs are neglected when below some threshold (e.g. $5 in Gourville 2003), it 
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is proposed that when marketers bracket costs narrowly (such as in per-day pricing) or broadly 
(such as in annual, aggregate pricing), consumers tend to construe the benefits using the same 
frame.  The change in how consumers bracket benefits affects how they will evaluate the overall 
contract. 
 Narrowly bracketed costs can increase the attractiveness of an offer because consumers 
evaluate the benefits associated with the payment frame and generalize that evaluation across the 
rest of the contract.  In contrast, when costs are broadly bracketed, consumers evaluate the 
aggregate benefits as a whole.  Since consumers do not value benefits linearly over scale, these 
frames can produce wildly divergent assessments of the contract’s benefits.  In particular, 
periodic pricing most increases assessments of a contract’s benefits when the sum of the parts is 
greater than the whole.  Such is the case when consumers respond to the presence of a stimulus 
but are appreciably less sensitive to changes in its magnitude, which is known as “scope-
insensitive” (Hsee et al. 2005). 
 Consumers often evaluate a bundle of goods based on an affective response to a 
representative unit of that good rather than the quantity in the bundle (Kahneman, Ritov and 
Schkade 1999). For example, one study presented three groups of respondents with an 
opportunity to cover deadly oil pools with nets that would save either 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 
birds and found that these three groups expressed nearly equal willingness to pay to save birds 
despite the hundredfold increase in impact (Desvousges et al. 1992).  In other examples, 
consumers are willing to pay only a little more to clean all the polluted lakes in Ontario than for 
a much smaller regional cleanup (Kahneman and Knetsch 1992), and only 28% more to protect 
57 wilderness areas than a single area (McFadden and Leonard 1993).  Perhaps most alarmingly, 





as many lives (Baron and Greene 1996).  Especially important, for present purposes, is that 
scope-insensitive preferences tend to reflect a high valuation of the first few units of a good 
while further units provide little or no perceived marginal benefit. 
 Not all consumers’ evaluations are scope-insensitive to the same degree.  For example, 
consumers are more scope-insensitive to many product categories than they are for money 
(Frederick and Fischhoff 1998).  It is easier to evaluate the desirability of some attributes than 
others, which suggests that product categories with less evaluable attributes would be more 
scope-insensitive than those with more evaluable attributes (Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount and 
Bazerman 1999).  Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) propose that value is constructed through the 
combination of affect-based and calculation-based processes.  They propose that affect-based 
processes produce scope-insensitive valuations.  These affective processes can be influenced by 
changing feelings associated with a stimulus directly, such as by varying one’s affective 
involvement with the target good, or indirectly by shifting attention to affective processes.  
Finally, research involving within-subjects evaluations of scale have found that scale influences 
judgments when scale information is salient and interpretable (Kahneman, Ritov and Schkade, 
1999).  This essay proposes that periodic pricing furnishes a context (“a narrow bracket”) that 
helps consumers interpret the magnitude of a contract’s benefits. 
 The present research proposes that narrowly-bracketed costs evoke narrowly-construed 
benefits, and that these narrowly-construed benefits (e.g., the warm glow from the first day of 
donating to a charity or the first day of a lease for a new luxury sedan) seem more attractive 
relative to the narrowly-construed cost than broadly-construed benefits do relative to their larger, 
aggregate costs.  In other words, while aggregate pricing encourages consumers to imagine that 





consumers to evaluate the benefits associated with a period of the payment frame (e.g., a day) 
and then generalize that evaluation across all periods of the payment frame (e.g., across the 365-
day length of the contract or lease).  So, the idea of narrowly-framed benefits, combined with the 
idea of scope-insensitivity, gives rise to the predictions about the conditions under which 
periodic pricing will cause consumers to find offers more attractive. 
 This essay argues that periodic pricing serves to magnify the attractiveness of offers 
involving emotional and/or symbolic product categories.  For example, an activist presented with 
an opportunity to donate to his or her cause on a daily basis will imagine the joy of helping a 
little every day, which feels better than 1/365 of the equivalent yearly donation.  Consequently he 
or she will donate a dollar per day to the cause when he or she would not donate $365 per year to 
the cause.  Convergent evidence from five studies suggest that periodic prices encourage 
consumers to narrowly-bracket a contract’s anticipated benefits, and that this can cause 
consumers to be more likely to agree to a contract involving more payments to one requiring 
fewer payments. 
 More specifically, the present research proposes and finds evidence in support of four 
distinct but related hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis II-1: Periodic pricing can magnify how consumers perceive a contract’s benefits, 
which can lead to purchase. 
 







Hypothesis I-3: Periodic pricing is most effective when consumers value a contract’s benefits in 
a scope-insensitive manner.  This happens, for example, when the product category being 
considered is relatively emotional, prompting valuation by affect rather than valuation by 
calculation.  
 
Hypothesis II-4: Consumers are more likely to agree to contracts under periodic pricing than 
aggregate pricing because periodic pricing improves how consumers perceive the contract’s 
least valued units rather than amplifying how they perceive its most valued units.  
 
 The final two hypotheses provide insight into when and why periodic pricing magnifies 
how consumers perceive a contract’s benefits, and thus qualify Hypotheses II-1 and II-2.  These 
hypotheses are consistent with a view that periodic pricing frames benefits narrowly, which helps 
counteract declining marginal sensitivity by generalizing the value conferred from a single 
period of time across all time periods.  In other words, narrowly bracketing costs similarly 
brackets the benefits, and the sum of the parts is disproportionately greater than the whole for 
benefits than for costs. 
 In what follows, five studies ask participants to make a hypothetical purchase decision 
where the cost is framed either on a periodic or single-payment basis.  Yet the surveys clearly 
state (and verify that participants understood) that actual payments will be automatically 
withdrawn from their paycheck with an intermediate frequency held constant across conditions.  
This allows one to differentiate framing effects from time preferences, as in Gourville 1998.  
Study 1 closely resembles the original pennies-a-day paradigm. It finds, consistent with 





personal benefits of donating independently from changes in perceptions of the donation cost.  
Study 2 examines a domain where pennies-a-day would predict that periodic pricing would fail, 
namely leasing luxury sports cars, and provides a direct test of Hypothesis II-2.  Although 
participants indicate that payments are not considered trivial, their responses suggest that 
periodic pricing again increases purchase intentions, and that this is attributed to changes in 
perceived benefits, which also provides further support of Hypothesis II-1.  The data suggests 
that the mediating role of greater anticipated benefits in Study 1 and 2 is not explained by 
decreased price perceptions.   
 Study 3, manipulates scope-insensitivity to impact the strength of periodic pricing to test 
Hypothesis II-3.  The results suggest that periodic pricing is more effective when consumers care 
more about whether they obtain at least one unit of a good than they do about obtaining 
additional units.  Study 4 provides additional process-level evidence in support of the new 
account of periodic pricing as given by Hypothesis II-4. Namely, narrow bracketing increases 
how consumers perceive a contract’s benefits by generalizing the highly-anticipated periods to 
other periods rather than magnifying perceptions of the highly-anticipated period.  Finally, Study 
5 replicates Study 2 while assessing the roles of cognitive capacity limitations, psychological 
distance differences and financial literacy as potential alternative explanations, and provides 
further evidence for Hypothesis II-4.  The essay concludes with a broader discussion of the 
implications of the expanded theory of periodic pricing. 
 
General Experimental Design 
 This section outlines the general experimental design used in each of the five studies. In 





payments.  Depending on the study, these payments were described as going to a charitable 
cause or towards a luxury purchase.  Depending on the condition, the payment was framed 
narrowly (as a per-day cost) or broadly (as a per-year cost), and participants rated how likely 
they were to agree to the contract on a 0-10 slider scale (see Appendix II-A). 
 Importantly, across all conditions, payment was described as being automatically 
deducted from participants’ monthly paycheck.  This ensured that 1) contract framing could be 
distinguished from intertemporal preferences, and 2) that there was not a concern about greater 
transaction costs (in time or money) associated with more frequent payments.  Additionally, the 
payment was generally weighted slightly in favor of the broad payment frame (i.e. the per-day 
cost more over the year) which further helps ensure that any preferences for more payments are 
financially meaningful. 
 One other design feature common to Studies 1-4 (except 3b) is that participants were 
asked to reflect on the benefits associated with the contract prior to assessing it.  This step 
appeared in several studies in order to explore how costs influence perceptions of benefits.  
Additionally, this feature reflects the natural consideration process of consumers before many 
actual purchases.  Notably, when this step was altered in Study 3b and eliminated from Study 5, 
the results suggest that reflecting on benefits was not necessary for periodic pricing to increase a 
contract’s perceived benefits. 
     
Study 1. Pleasure of Daily Donations 
Overview 
 Study 1 explores consumers’ perception of costs and benefits in charitable giving and 





opportunity to donate a daily amount or an equivalent yearly amount to a charity and tested how 
the daily vs. annual frame affected their perceptions of the offer’s costs and benefits. If 
participants are more likely to donate when the costs are framed as daily donations, it could be 
because of one (or both) of two possibilities.  One possibility is that the daily frame may lead 
participants to anticipate more daily pleasure from giving, which would be consistent with the 
“reframed / amplified benefits” account and Hypothesis II-1.  Alternately (or additionally), 
participants may perceive the cost to be more trivial (as predicted by the pennies-a-day model).  
If anticipated daily pleasure accounts for the effect of daily frame on donation assessments, there 
is also a third explanation that is tested in this study: participants may anticipate more daily 
pleasure because the costs are more trivial, rather than because the frame changes perceived 
benefits directly.  The purpose of Study 1 was to test the relative explanatory power of perceived 
costs and benefits in whether a daily payment frame increases donation likelihood. 
 
Method 
 150 complete surveys were provided through an online panel of unique participants 
drawn from the Amazon Mechanical Turk population who had at least a 98% approval rating and 
were located in the United States.  Participants were asked to consider paying a donation framed 
either on a per-day basis [periodic price frame] or yearly basis [aggregate price frame].  As in 
later studies, participants were told that the actual donation would be automatically deducted 
from their monthly paychecks and the contract term was fixed to control for time preferences.  






Imagine that you are earning $50,000
17
.  Your company is sponsoring a 
donation drive to help the underprivileged in the United States.  Your 
participation would be optional and completely anonymous. 
If you choose to make the requested donation, it would be automatically 





$350 per year  ($1 per day) 
 
Next, please pause for a moment to imagine what benefits you would 
receive if you agreed to donate the amount requested.  Please briefly 





Participants then evaluated the offer, answering the five questions below on a 0-10 scale: 
1. What is the likelihood you would agree to donate the amount requested?   
2. How attractive is the donation opportunity?  
3. How favorable is the offer? 
4. Would you feel better if you made the donation or if you didn't make the 
donation?   
5. Overall, how valuable is the contribution, compared with its cost? 
 
Next, the participants answered questions that would help identify differences in 
perceived costs and benefits depending on the price frame: 
1. How trivial is the amount you were asked to pay?  
2. How much daily pleasure would you get from donating the requested amount 
to the cause? 
 
These questions served as the basis for perceived costliness and benefits associated with 
the donation opportunity.  The analysis evaluates how the two price frames influenced 
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 Participants reported annual income to be, on average, $52,673 (SD 40,255).  This follows Gourville 
(1998) in asking participants to make this assumption about hypothetical income when considering donation 
requests. 
18
 The emphasis on monthly deductions was included in the description to all participants, to ensure that the 
differences are due to framing and not temporal discounting.  Note also that the yearly price frame is less expensive 
than the daily price frame.  These are features borrowed from Gourville’s (1998) design. 
19
 Participants were asked to explicitly consider benefits in order to increase the salience of benefits under 
both the yearly and daily frame.  Importantly, this instruction was held constant across conditions and was removed 





participants’ purchase assessments and their perceptions of the contract’s costs and benefits.  It 
also evaluates whether differences in participants’ perceptions explain their purchase intentions. 
 
Results 
 As Figure II-1 shows, periodic pricing increases all five purchase assessment measures.  
Consistent with Gourville (1998), donation likelihood ratings increase (yearly vs. daily frame; 
Myearly = 5.1, SD = 3.3 vs. Mdaily = 6.1, SD = 3.4; F(1,148) = 3.55, p = 0.06).  Additionally, 
periodic pricing increases the perceived attractiveness of the offer (Myearly = 5.8, SD = 2.7 vs. 
Mdaily = 6.8, SD = 2.8; F(1,148) = 4.63, p = 0.03) its favorability (Myearly = 6.4, SD = 2.4 vs. 
Mdaily = 7.2, SD = 2.3; F(1,148) = 4.54, p = 0.03), the comparisons of feelings (Myearly = 5.8, SD 
= 2.7 vs. Mdaily = 7.2, SD = 2.4; F(1,148) = 12.26, p < 0.001) and the perception of the 
contribution’s value compared with its cost (Myearly = 6.4, SD = 2.6 vs. Mdaily = 7.4, SD = 2.3; 
F(1,148) = 5.70, p = 0.02).  Responses to these items were standardized and averaged into a 
purchase assessment scale constructed from average z-scores (Cronbach’s α = 0.89). That 
purchase assessment index was higher under the periodic price frame than under the aggregate 
price frame (Myearly = -0.20, SD = 0.8 vs. Mdaily = 0.19, SD = 0.8; F(1,148) = 8.24, p < 0.001).  
These results suggest that periodic pricing elevated people’s evaluations of the offer. 
 The analysis next compared consumers’ perceptions of benefits and costs across the two 
conditions.  The results indicate that perceptions of daily pleasure increased under periodic 
pricing (Myearly = 4.8, SD = 2.8 vs. Mdaily = 4.8, SD = 2.8; F(1,148) = 4.84, p = 0.03) while 
triviality ratings did not differ significantly (Myearly = 4.2, SD = 2.8 vs. Mdaily = 4.9, SD = 3.2; 
F(1,148) = 2.22, p = 0.14).  Daily pleasure and cost triviality are each highly correlated with 





Figure II-1a. Donation Intentions, by Price Frame 
Daily price frame increased multiple donation intentions measures. 
 
 
Figure II-1b. Daily Pleasure and Triviality and Payment Frame 







 To examine how much each factor of interest—the perception of benefits (anticipated 
daily pleasure) and of costs (perceived cost triviality)—contribute to the effect of 
periodic/aggregate pricing on donation assessments, the analysis jointly estimates simultaneous 
equations with two mediators.  The analysis follows the mediation testing procedure developed 
by Preacher and Hayes (2008) and endorsed by Zhao, Lynch, and Chen (2010).  Three equations 
were simultaneously estimated through seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) to assess the 
related relationships between 1) benefits as a function of payment frame, 2) costs as a function of 
payment frame, and 3) donation intentions as a function of benefits, costs and frame.  Resamples 
were bootstrapped 5000 times and this determined a 95% confidence interval.  If this confidence 
interval excludes zero, the data indicates the presence of a significant mediator, with p<0.05.   
 The results indicate that the indirect effect of daily pleasure mediates daily payments and 
donation intentions (β=0.16, 95% CI = {0.01 , 0.30}, p = 0.03) while cost triviality falls short of 
statistical significance (β=0.08, 95% CI = {-0.03, 0.18}, p = 0.17)20.  Most tellingly, 40% of the 
total effect of daily payments on donation intentions is explained by daily pleasure, double the 
effect of cost triviality.  This result is not predicted by the pennies-a-day framework, and it 
provides further evidence that periodic pricing changes the perceptions of an offer’s benefits in 
addition to its costs. 
 One potential concern is that cost triviality may be a noisier measure than perceived 
benefits.  To test this, an additional model was estimated with multiple measures of cost 
perceptions to increase reliability of the cost perception measure.  Ratings for cost triviality, 
expensiveness and costliness were combined into a single factor using principle-component 
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 To assess the triviality measure’s validity, the survey asked for ratings of two other cost-related 
questions: expensiveness and costliness.  These measures correlate with triviality -0.56 and -0.59, respectively.    To 
allow an additional test of the hypotheses, an additional bootstrapped model of simultaneously estimated equations 








  In this model, relative to the aggregate frame, in the periodic price frame participants 
perceived the contract’s benefits to be higher (p=0.027), costs to be lower, donation intentions 
increase with perceived benefits (p<0.001) and donation intentions decrease with perceived costs 
(p<0.001).  The indirect effect of periodic pricing on donation intentions through perceived 
benefits remains roughly the same size and direction (β=0.16, 95% CI = {0.02 , 0.30}, p = 0.03) 
and the indirect effect through cost perceptions is larger than the model with a single-measure 
and is statistically significant (β=0.16, 95% CI = {0.04 , 0.30}, p = 0.02).  So while improving 
the reliability of the perceived cost measure improves the explanatory power of cost perceptions, 
the perceived benefits results are not an artifact of low reliability in the perceived cost measure.  
Importantly, this analysis highlights that the present research supplements and extends the 
pennies-a-day model rather than presenting contradictory evidence. 
 Finally the analysis tests another alternate hypothesis, namely, that participants may have 
felt additional pleasure merely because they the cost seemed smaller, rather than due to the 
alternate bracketing itself.  To test this, the simultaneous equation model was modified to make 
perceived benefits a function of perceived costs.  The analysis tested whether perceived benefits 
continued to mediate daily frame and the donations scale despite this effect, or alternately, 
whether the indirect effect of perceived benefits is itself mediated by perceived costs.  The 
results suggest that daily pleasure again mediates daily payments and donation intentions 
(β=0.13, 95% CI = {0, 0.27}, p = 0.05).22  In contrast, the path price frame -> cost triviality -> 
perceived benefits -> donation intentions is not significant (β=0.02, 95% CI = {-0.01, 0.06}, p = 
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 The three measures were well represented by a single factor as the eigenvalue for that factor was 2.3 
while all other eigenvalues were well less than 1. 
22
 The bias-corrected confidence interval excludes zero, suggesting that the indirect effect is statistically 





0.23).  This suggests that the mediating effects of benefits are not explained by the whether the 
costs appear trivial. 
 
Figure II-1c. Mediating Payment Frame and Donation Intentions 
Perceived daily pleasure mediates the relationship between daily payments and donation 




 Study 1 provides evidence that periodic pricing increases purchase assessments and that 
this is substantially driven by how periodic pricing changes the perceived benefits of the offer. 
People expect the donation to bring them more daily pleasure, and as a result they assess the 





 The novel account offered herein predicts this novel result as Hypothesis II-1.  One 
implication of the present framework is that periodic pricing can increase purchase intentions 
outside the trivial cost domain.  This prediction (Hypothesis II-2) is explored in Study 2. 
 
Study 2. Not Just Pennies      
Overview 
Study 1 found that periodic pricing can increase the attractiveness of an offer by changing 
the representation of its benefits.  If periodic pricing increases purchase assessments by 
magnifying the offer’s benefits, then periodic pricing could, in theory, increase purchase 
intentions even when costs are not perceived as trivial.  This prediction (Hypothesis II-2) stands 
in contrast to previous research, which found that periodic pricing has a ceiling around $5 per 
day for university students above which the strategy would backfire (Gourville, 2003).  In that 
study, respondents would rather pay a monthly sum rather than daily payments made towards 
property taxes ($11.50/day), rent ($25/day), home mortgage ($49/day), and income tax 
($58/day).  In other words, previous research has found a reversal for large amounts of money. 
Yet anecdotal evidence suggests that per-day pricing can work for non-trivial costs since 
well-known brands have successfully framed goods on an expensive per-day basis.  The Acura 
TL leases for $12 per day.  Disney offers 4-day passes for $30 per day, and Carnival offers three-
to-seven day cruises for $70/day.  Note that these product categories are more hedonically 
appealing than the rather pragmatic categories tested in the previous study.  Unlike the other 
expensive product categories previously examined, cars and cruises are exciting products prone 






Study 2 tests whether per-day pricing can increase willingness to agree to lease an affect-
rich car for a non-trivial amount of money-- $20.  Appendix II-B tests whether $20 is still 
considered non-trivial when it is such a small fraction of the total underlying base cost of a car.  
That ancillary study changed by 10x the daily price of a car ($2 to $20) and its total cost 
underlying price ($10k to $100k) and asked participants whether they viewed the cost as trivial 
or expensive.  Comparing effect sizes, the 10x change in daily price accounted for 23% of 
variance while the 10x change in base price accounted for only 1% of variance.  It appears that 
cost perceptions are determined by the recurring price paid rather than the price relative to a base 
reference cost. 
In Study 2, participants were expected to prefer to pay for a luxury automobile—an 
affect-rich product—on a daily basis, even when the costs are not considered trivial.  If this 
prediction, Hypothesis II-2, is supported, it would be the first evidence that the effects of 
periodic pricing on purchase intent are not restricted to small amounts of money.  Additionally, it 
would be further evidence that something other than cost triviality is at play in affecting 
consumer preference.  However, if perceived costliness is the only thing making narrow periodic 
pricing effective, there should be no effect or a greater willingness to accept the offer under the 
aggregate (yearly) price frame.  The data also allows testing another alternative, that periodic 
pricing may change perceived benefits because it changed perceived costliness, rather than 






 Sixty online panelists were asked to imagine leasing their choice of four luxury cars
23
.  
Panelists viewed a picture of each and were told that the 36-month lease cost $20 per day 
[periodic price frame] or $7,250 per year [aggregate price frame].  They then read the following 
scenario: 
The Scenario 






A 36-month lease, with unlimited miles. Payments would be automatically 
deducted from your monthly paycheck. 
Your employer is willing to pay all additional taxes and fees and heavily 
subsidize the lease payment.   They will also provide comprehensive insurance for 
the car at no additional cost. This means that you can lease the car at a steep 
discount. If you reject the offer, you will not receive any alternate compensation 
from your employer. 
 
Following the statement of the lease terms, four cars were listed with their retail prices 
and images from automotive.com.  As in Study 1, the participants reflected on the benefits they 
would receive from the contract prior to responding to the dependent measures. 
Participants rated their likelihood of agreeing to the lease, how fun it would be to lease 
the car, and the cost triviality of the lease price on 0-10 scales.  Finally, participants rated some 
additional items: how important it is to own a nice car, knowledge about cars, experience with 
the car (hours driving, whether they drive), gender, age, income, and language fluency.  Any of 
these factors could affect people’s preferences for luxury automobiles and thus could act as 
confounding variables. 
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 The luxury cars included 2011 Mercedes-Benz E550 Sedan (Retail Price: $59,600), 2011 Lexus LS 460 
(Retail Price: $65,380), 2011 BMW 5-Series 550i Sedan (Retail Price: $59,700), and 2011 Cadillac STS (Retail 
Price: $52,720) and the sample was drawn from Amazon Mechanical Turk’s population in the United States with an 
approval rating of at least 98%. 
24
 The employer subsidy is immaterial as the results show that the mediation by perceived benefits is not 





 Participants were predicted to be more likely to agree to the auto lease that quotes a daily 
price rather than one that quotes a yearly price. It was further expected that ratings of how fun 
the car is to drive (rather than or in addition to cost triviality) would account for the effect.  
 
Results 
 Participants were more likely to agree to the lease in the periodic price frame than the 
aggregate frame (yearly vs. daily frame; Myearly = 5.0, SD = 3.6 vs. Mdaily = 6.9, SD = 2.7; F(1,58) 
= 4.89, p = 0.03), an effect which remains significant when controlling for the potentially 
confounding variables (F(1,50) = 5.18, p = 0.03).  Participants in the periodic price frame were 
directionally more likely to report that it would be more “fun” to lease the car (Myearly = 6.6, SD 
= 2.9 vs. Mdaily = 7.6, SD = 2.1; F(1,58) = 2.23, p = 0.14) and that the cost is directionally more 
trivial (Myearly = 2.8, SD = 2.9 vs. Mdaily = 4.0, SD = 2.8; F(1,58) = 2.26, p = 0.14).  Controlling 
for the potentially confounding variables, participants expected the car lease to be more fun in 
the periodic price frame than the aggregate price frame (F(1,50) = 4.59, p = 0.04).  However, 
controlling for these same variables, the differences in the triviality ratings was not statistically 
significant (F(1,50) = 1.64, p = 0.21).  In each condition, participants reported that the price of 
the car was below the middle triviality rating value, 5 (yearly: t(31) = -4.1468, p = 0.0001; 95% 
CI = {2.2, 3.8}; daily: t(27) = -1.95, p = 0.03; 95% CI = {2.9, 4.6}). 
 The analysis next examined how well anticipated fun and cost triviality account for the 
differences between periodic and aggregate pricing on lease intentions.  As in Study 1, 
simultaneous equations were jointly estimated using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) with 
the two mediators and the control variables and bootstrap 5000 times.  As shown in Figure 2, 





2.05}, p = 0.03) while cost triviality does not (β=0.17, 95% CI = {-0.10, 0.77}, p = 0.46).  How 
fun it would be to drive the car explains over 60% of the relationship between pay frequency and 
lease likelihood, while triviality accounts for 10%. 
 
Figure II-2. Mediating Payment Frame and Lease Intentions 
Willingness to lease the car increases under periodic pricing and is mediated by how fun the car 
would be to lease. 
 
 
 Finally, a modified model again allows a test of whether the mediating role of perceived 
benefits was explained through changes in perceived costs rather than directly by the price 
frame.  In the modified version simultaneous equation model, anticipated fun was considered to 
be a function of cost triviality.  The results indicate that anticipated fun still significantly 





0.04).  The path price frame -> cost triviality -> anticipated fun -> lease intentions was not 
significant (β=0.02, 95% CI = {-0.06, 0.15}, p = 0.72).  This suggests that anticipated fun did not 
increase merely because perceived costs decreased, but rather that the daily frame directly 
changed how participants thought about the benefits of the lease. 
 
Discussion 
 Study 2 finds an effect of periodic pricing on willingness to purchase for a decision 
where costs are clearly not trivial
25—a result which cannot be explained by the pennies-a-day 
framework: people were willing to pay for a luxury automobile that is priced on a daily ($20) 
basis rather than on a yearly ($7,250) basis. This result is consistent with Hypothesis II-2, and 
provides further evidence that something apart from the trivialization of cost makes periodic 
pricing effective. Consistent with the results of Study 1 and providing further support for 
Hypothesis II-1, Study 2 suggests that people perceive greater benefits in the daily cost 
condition.  They think it would be “more fun” to lease the car, and this fully mediates the 
periodic pricing effect.      
 The results of Study 2 contrast with the finding that periodic pricing backfires for large 
payments (Gourville, 1998).  This is attributed to the difference in product categories used in the 
previous versus those used in Study 2.  Namely, the product categories used in previous research 
were dull and functional, whereas the current study presented an offer for a flashy, hedonic 
product – a new sports car – a prospect that is particularly exciting on the first day but provides 
less additional value with each subsequent day.  In other words, the findings may have resulted 
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 The daily price far exceeds the $5 upper-bound suggested by previous work (Gourville, 2003), and 
respondents indicate that the price frames are considered equivalently nontrivial.  To evaluate a potential concern 
that $20 may seem to be trivial relative to the price of the car, Appendix II-B describes an ancillary study finding 
that a lease’s daily cost influences triviality perceptions much more compellingly than the daily cost relative to the 





because participants were presented a highly valued, but scope-insensitive stimulus.  The next 
study provides a more direct test of the relationship between scope-insensitivity and periodic 
pricing effectiveness.  
 
Study 3. Scope Insensitivity and Daily Donations 
Overview 
Study 3 explores the role of scope-insensitive preferences on how consumers represent a 
contract’s benefits differently under periodic pricing and aggregate pricing.  It is expected that 
periodic pricing will be more effective when the contract’s initial benefits convey dramatically 
more value than subsequent units (Hypothesis II-3).  In other words, the boost in purchase intent 
– which this essay argues is produced by the inflation/magnification of an offer’s benefits – is 
most pronounced when consumers are relatively scope-insensitive over the contract’s benefits.  
As Figure II-3a shows, narrow cost bracketing amplifies total perceived benefits by encouraging 
consumers to adopt narrow benefit bracketing, which increases reliance on the highly valued 
initial unit. 
Study 3 manipulates scope-insensitivity to find further evidence that periodic pricing is 
most effective when the contract’s benefits are scope-insensitive with a large initial onset (the 
big initial spike).  Past research has found that affective involvement increases scope-
insensitivity by promoting valuation by feeling over valuation by calculation (Hsee, 
Rottenstreich and Xiao, 2005).  This study manipulates scope-insensitivity using two different 
methods that encourage participants to evaluate a contract’s benefits more through valuation by 






Figure II-3a. Valuing Scope Insensitivity 
When a contract’s  benefit schedule is scope-insensitive, periodic pricing increases the benefits 










Consistent with Hypothesis II-3, the general prediction is that, in each experiment, 
periodic pricing will increase contributions to a charity more when valuation is more scope-
insensitive, which is when subjects rely more on valuation by feeling over valuation by 
calculation.  First, Study 3a asks some participants to read a passage that ties positive affect to 
the contract’s benefits, while a control group reads a passage with unrelated positive affect.  
Second, Study 3b describes an opportunity to donate to a charitable cause either in the presence 
or absence of an emotionally evocative picture.  In each case, it is expected that, consistent with 
Hypothesis II-3, periodic pricing will increase contributions to a charity more under the more 
emotional appeal.  In contrast, if periodic pricing does not influence how consumers represent 





sensitivity and price frame.  This lends further support to the notion that periodic pricing is 
strongest when the contract’s benefits possess a large initial spike. 
 
Study 3a Overview 
In this study it is expected that, consistent with Hypothesis II-3, periodic pricing will 
increase contributions to a charity more after reading a passage that ties positive affect to the 
contract’s benefits compared with after reading the control passage with unrelated positive 
affect.  The two passages were pretested to verify that they induce different degrees of scope-
insensitivity by investigating how much participants are willing to work for various donation 
amounts.  Then the study manipulated the passage and donation request frame (daily or yearly) 
to test whether, consistent with Hypothesis II-3, the passage increased the ability of periodic 
pricing to increase charitable contributions.  In contrast, if periodic pricing does not influence 
how consumers represent the contract’s benefits, the results would show no interaction between 
price frame and the passage read.  
 
Study 3a Method 
 This study provided 227 online participants with a hypothetical opportunity to donate to 
the breast-cancer cause, Susan G. Komen for the Cure®.  To manipulate scope-insensitivity, the 
survey asked participants to read a passage evoking differing levels of affective involvement 
with the cause.  Participants were assigned to a low affective involvement with the cause [scope-
sensitive] or high affective involvement with the cause [scope-insensitive] condition, and were 






 Under the condition with high affective involvement with the cause, participants read:  
Imagine that one of your closest loved ones has been fighting breast cancer for 
years.  How would you feel learning that her life may be saved by a new 
treatment made possible by Susan G. Komen for the Cure? 
 Under the condition with low affective involvement with the cause, participants read the 
following statement, which was verified to generate an equivalent mood
26
, but not to provide 
nearly the affective involvement with the cause: 
Think about how it would feel to receive an unexpected card in the mail today 
from a loved one—just someone reaching out to let you know they care. 
 
 As in Study 1, participants were quoted the asking price ($1 per day or $350 for the year) 
and asked to pause and write about what benefits they would receive if they agreed to donate. 
 
Study 3a Pretest 
 First, a pretest tested whether the affective involvement manipulation influenced scope-
insensitivity.  Though the manipulation is conceptually based on the affective involvement 
manipulation used by Hsee and Rottenstreich’s (2004) Study 427, it was important to ensure that 
the particular affective involvement manipulation similarly manipulated scope sensitivity. 
 In the pretest, 325 participants were asked how long they would be willing to work for 
Komen to receive an amount of money.  Participants were first either exposed to the high 
affective involvement or low affective involvement condition, then read a scenario: 
Susan G. Komen for the Cure, the global leader of the breast cancer movement, 
having invested nearly $1.5 billion since inception in 1982. 
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 Positive and negative affect were measured through short PANAS (Mackinnon et al. 1999) and there 
were no significant differences (ps> 0.20). 
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 In that study, participants in a high affective involvement condition were asked to put themselves in the 





As the world’s largest grassroots network of breast cancer survivors and activists, 
we’re working together to save lives, empower people, ensure quality care for all 
and energize science to find the cures. 
 
Thanks to events like the Susan G. Komen Race for the Cure®, and generous 
contributions from our partners, sponsors and fellow supporters, we have become 
the largest source of nonprofit funds dedicated to the fight against breast cancer in 
the world. 
 
Suppose your employer offered to make a donation to Susan G. Komen for the 
Cure on your behalf if you worked overtime without pay. 
  
What is the maximum number of hours you would be willing to work so that the 
Susan G. Komen Foundation receives $X? 
 
 Participants were either told that Komen would receive $10, $50, $250 or $1250.  
Participants who are more scope-insensitive to dollars donated to Komen than they are to 
working overtime would be willing to work fewer hours per dollar as the total donation amount 
increases.  Hence, if the affectively engaging passage increases scope-insensitivity, there would 
be a significant interaction between donation amount and affective involvement.  In particular, 
the hours per dollar would decline faster over donation amount after reading the affectively 
engaging passage than the control passage. 
 After collecting data on the number of hours participants were willing to work, dollars 
per hour donated for each participant was computed as 
                   
               
.  Since the self-
reported hours were not restricted to a range, outliers that fell outside the interval {Q1-
1.5*IQR,Q3+1.5*IQR} were eliminated through a box-and-whisker plot (Tukey 1977).  The 
remaining 308 (95%) of participants reported that they would work, on average 0.05 hours 
(SD=0.05) per donated dollar.  
 Figure II-3b shows that manipulating affective involvement with the cause changed 





predict hours worked per donated dollar, a profile analysis (2x4 mixed ANOVA), included 
affective involvement (high vs low) as a between-subjects factor and amount (10, 50, 250, 1250) 
as a repeated measure.  The results indicate that affective involvement increased hours per 
donated dollar (Mhigh = 0.054, SD = 0.056 vs. Mlow = 0.048, SD = 0.053; F(1,300) = 4.67; p = 
0.03).  Amount donated also reduced hours per donated dollar (M10 = 0.103, SD = 0.070 vs. M50 
= 0.059, SD = 0.048 vs. M250 = 0.027, SD = 0.024 vs. M1250 = 0.022, SD = 0.022; F(3,300) = 
59.21; p < 0.0001.  Critically, the interaction between affective involvement with the cause and 
donation amount was significant (F(3,300)=3.36; p=0.02) which suggests that scope-insensitivity  
 
Figure II-3b. Pretesting Affective Involvement Manipulation 

















was greater in the condition with high affective involvement with the cause than in the condition 
with low affective involvement with the cause. 
 
Study 3a Results 
 As Figure II-3c illustrates, periodic pricing increases likelihood of donating only under 
the condition with high affective involvement with the cause (high affective involvement: Myearly 
= 5.9, SD = 3.3 vs. Mdaily = 5.6, SD = 3.5; F(1,223) = 0.2, p = 0.68; low affective involvement: 
Myearly = 5.4, SD = 3.4 vs. Mdaily = 6.7, SD = 3.3; F(1,223) = 3.8, p = 0.05; interaction: F(1,223) 
= 2.76, p < 0.10). 
 
Figure II-3c. Donation Likelihood, by Affective Involvement and Payment Frequency 







Discussion and Overview of Study 3b 
 Study 3b addresses some possible limitations of the manipulation of scope sensitivity 
used in Study 3a, which manipulates scope sensitivity by asking participants to read an 
emotionally-laden passage inducing affective evaluation of a contract’s benefits.  It is possible 
that the passage may have manipulated other constructs unrelated to scope insensitivity.  
Consequently, Study 3b tests the robustness of the findings of Study 3a by manipulating scope-
insensitivity using a different methodology.  This study also tested whether the results observed 
thus far replicate under conditions when the participants were not explicitly asked to reflect on 
the benefits they would receive from the donation.   
 Study 3b again asked participants to rate their likelihood of making a hypothetical 
charitable donation, and this time it manipulated scope-insensitivity by presenting some 
participants with a picture representing the charity’s beneficiary alongside each charity 
description.
28
  It was expected, consistent with Hypothesis II-3, that in the presence of the affect-
rich picture, participants would be more willing to donate in the daily condition than the yearly 
condition.  On the other hand, if periodic pricing has no effect on how people represent a 
contract’s benefits, the presence of the picture should not change whether periodic pricing leads 
to a greater willingness to donate.  Taken together with Study 3a, an interaction between the 
presence of the picture and payment frame would offer strong support that periodic pricing 
affects the representation of a contract’s benefits.  It would indicate that periodic pricing is most 
effective when the first unit acquired by a contract provides a disproportionate benefit relative to 
additional units. 
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Study 3b Method 
 This study recruited 577 unique online participants
29
 from Mechanical Turk to make a 
decision involving a hypothetical donation to one of four charities.  These charities (the only four 
presented to participants in this study) and their descriptions are included in Appendix II-C.  For 
half of participants, this donation appeal was accompanied by a picture of the cause’s 
beneficiary, while the other half did not include a picture.  As before, this donation was 
presented in a periodic price frame ($1.00 per day) or aggregate price frame ($350 per year), and 
the survey noted that the hypothetical donation would be automatically deducted from their 
monthly paycheck and anonymous.  Unlike Study 3a, participants were not explicitly asked to 
reflect on the benefits of the contract.  Instead, they were asked to verify the amount requested 
before moving to the survey page containing the dependent measures, and they were asked an 
open-ended question “What is the cause being supported by the donation?”  Then participants 
rated the likelihood that they would agree to donate the amount requested, from 0 (not at all 
likely) to 10 (extremely likely).  Finally, participants answered demographics consisting of (and 
only of) gender, typical yearly donation amount to all causes, age, marital status, income, and 
education. 
 
Study 3b Results 
 Figure II-3d-i summarizes the results across scenarios.  Across scenarios, participants are 
more likely to donate under the periodic pricing frame (yearly vs. daily: Myearly = 4.2, SD = 3.2; 
Mdaily = 5.4, SD = 3.5; F(1,558) = 4.52, p < 0.05).  In an ANOVA analysis, there is no main 
effect of affective content on donation likelihood (Mnopic = 4.7, SD = 3.2; Mpicture = 4.8, SD = 3.4; 
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F(1,558) = 0.15, p = 0.70).  However there is an interaction between affective content and 
donation likelihood (Myearly-nopic = 4.7, SD = 3.2; Mdaily-nopic = 5.4, SD = 3.2; Myearly-pic = 4.2, SD = 
3.2; Mdaily-pic = 5.4, SD = 3.5; F(1,558) = 3.91, p < 0.05).  The simple effect of payment frame is 
significant in the high affect condition (F(1,558)=8.51, p<0.01) but not in the low affect 
condition (F(1,558)=0.01; p=0.92).  As Figure II-3d-ii shows, this general pattern of results 
appears in each of the four scenarios.  These results provide corroborate the results form Study 
3a finding that more scope-insensitive value functions, such as when affective content of a 
stimulus is high, increase the likelihood that periodic price framing leads to purchase. 
 
Figure II-3d-i. All Scenarios: Likelihood of Donation by Affective Content and Pay Frequency 







 These findings are further supported by additional analysis.  First, a variant of the 
ANOVA model considered the higher-order interactions between payment frame, affect and 
scenario.  These included payment frame X scenario, affect X scenario, and payment frame X 
affect X scenario.  In this model, scenario has a significant main effect (Mhomeless = 5.1, SD = 3.3; 
Mpandas = 3.9, SD = 3.2; Municef = 5.2, SD = 3.2; Mwounded = 4.7, SD = 3.3; F(3,546) = 4.93, p = 
0.002), but there are no higher-order effects (p’s>0. 30).  Price frame and the interaction between 
price frame and affect remain significant (price frame: F(1,546)=5.01, p=0.03; price frame X 
affect: F(1,546)=4.18, p=0.04).  The results indicate that periodic pricing increases purchase 
likelihood under high affect (F(1,546)=8.66, p<0.01) but not under low affect (F(1,546)=0.01, 
p=0.92).  This pattern of results is virtually identical to that of a model excluding the three-way 
interaction.  It is also does not differ meaningfully from a model including only the main effect 
of payment frame, affect, their interaction and a scenario main effect. 
 Additionally, an additional ANCOVA analysis that included payment frame, affect, their 
interaction, the scenario effect, as well as all collected demographic factors.  These include 
gender (categorical), typical yearly donation amount to all causes (6 categories), age 
(continuous), marital status (categorical), income (continuous) and education (8 categories).  In 
this model, there is a main effect of gender (F(1,539)=9.59, p=0.002), typical annual donation 
amount (F(5,539)=6.25, p<0.0001), and education (F(7,539)=1.81, p=0.08).  Yet there remains a 
significant main effect of payment frame on donation likelihood (F(1,539)=4.18, p=0.04), and a 
marginally significant interaction between payment frame and affect on donation likelihood 
(F(1,539)=3.51, p=0.06).  Turning next to simple effects, participants expressed a greater 





affect condition (F(1,539)=9.28, p=0.002) but not in the low affect condition(F(1,539)=0.01, 
p=0.91). 
 
Figure II-3d-ii. By Scenario: Likelihood of Donation by Affective Content and Pay Frequency 
 
Discussion 
 Study 3 finds further support for the idea that periodic pricing changes how consumers 
perceive the contract’s benefits.  In particular there is evidence that periodic pricing is effective 
when participants are scope-insensitive to a contract’s benefits, in support of Hypothesis II-3.  
By manipulating affective involvement with the target product in two ways, Study 3 is able to 





providing initial insight into how periodic pricing works.  Study 3 suggests that periodic pricing 
works well for scope-insensitive product categories and for modes of presentation that increase 
scope-insensitivity.  This further suggests that periodic pricing encourages consumers to 
generalize an instance of a contract’s benefits to the entire payment period. 
 The present framework posits that, following per-day pricing, the first unit of 
consumption is relied on more for general assessments of the contract, which for more scope-
insensitive goods, produces a positive net effect.  This offers another differentiation from the 
classic pennies-a-day framework, which has no prediction about how affective involvement 
would influence willingness to purchase.  Study 4 explores the specific mechanisms underlying 
this account. 
  
Study 4. Which Benefits Increase? 
Overview 
The fourth study further explores when periodic pricing is effective and, through 
supporting process data, provides further insight into the underlying cognitive changes when 
narrow costs amplify perceived benefits.  This study explores differences in how periodic and 
aggregate price frames call to mind different representations of a proposed contract’s benefits. 
Narrowly framed periodic pricing could magnify a contract’s benefits through one of two 
possible routes.  First, periodic pricing could increase the extent to which a representative 
periodic benefit gets generalized across payments (consistent with Hypothesis II-4).  In this case, 
the “first day” driving a car is generalized across all days with the car, which increases the 
evaluation of the other days.  Alternatively, periodic pricing could magnify how consumers 





the first day with the car.  Under this alternate hypothesis, narrow periodic pricing would make 
the first day driving the car seem better, but it would not affect how the other days are perceived. 
The fourth study collects process evidence to better understand which of these two 
accounts best explains the results.  Another goal of this study is to test whether the observed 
differences in perceived benefits arise only because participants were explicitly asked to think 
about the contract’s benefits.      
 
Method 
 In this study 95 Mechanical Turk participants were asked to make a decision about a 
hypothetical donation to Unicef.  A description of the charity was presented, and the donation 
was requested in a periodic price frame ($2.50 per day) or aggregate price frame ($900 for the 
year). Whereas previous studies asked participants to specifically think about the contract’s 
benefits, in this study participants were asked to “pause for a moment to think through the 
decision about whether or not to donate.  Please make a list of all of the complete thoughts you 
have about this decision. You may enter up to 10 thoughts.”  Participants then rated, on a 0-10 
scale, how likely they would donate, and how satisfied they expected to be on the most and least 
satisfying day if they agreed to the contract.  Finally, participants categorized their own thoughts 
as either advantages or disadvantages of donating in a process similar to the aspect listing and 
rating protocol used by Johnson et al. (2007).  As before, the survey explicitly stated that the 
hypothetical donation would be automatically deducted from their monthly paycheck.  The data 







 The data suggests that participants are more likely to donate under the periodic pricing 
frame (yearly vs. daily: Myearly = 4.9, SD = 3.1; Mdaily = 6.8, SD = 3.1; F(1,93) = 8.46, p < 0.01).  
Participants also list more advantages under the periodic pricing frame (yearly vs daily: Myearly = 
1.7, SD = 1.6; Mdaily = 2.4, SD = 1.6; F(1,93) = 5.25, p = 0.03) but an equivalent number of 
disadvantages (Myearly = 1.7, SD = 1.2; Mdaily = 1.5, SD = 2.0; F(1,93) = 0.16, p = 0.69).  The 
data further indicate that the donation period’s least pleasurable day is rated more highly under 
the periodic pricing frame than the aggregate pricing frame (Myearly = 2.4, SD = 2.5; Mdaily = 3.6, 
SD = 2.8; F(1,93) = 4.58, p = 0.03).  In contrast, there were no difference in expectations about 
the most satisfying day (Myearly = 7.3, SD = 2.7; Mdaily = 7.0, SD = 2.7; F(1,93) = 0.32, p = 0.57).   
 
Discussion 
 Study 4 finds evidence that per-day pricing changes how consumers represent the 
benefits associated with periodic payments.  Under the narrow periodic pricing frame, 
participants rated their satisfaction on the worst day more highly.  In contrast, pricing frame had 
no effect on how participants rated their satisfaction on the best day.  This is evidence consistent 
with Hypothesis II-4, namely, that periodic pricing helps extend projected benefits, rather than 
increase the peak projected experience.  This suggests that per-day pricing imposes a structure 
that helps consumers make a stream of future intangible events more salient. 
 Study 4 also addresses a possible limitation of previous studies.  The study finds results 
consistent with previous studies even though participants were not asked to consider the 





of previous studies.  Study 5 builds on this design feature to provide further insight into the 
psychological mechanisms that cause periodic pricing to increase purchase likelihood. 
 
Study 5. Not Just Pennies, Redux 
Overview 
The fifth study revisits the general framework of Study 2 to better understand why 
narrow periodic price frames increase purchase intentions by assessing several possible 
explanations.  Hypothesis II-4 predicts that the periodic price frame improves extends favorable 
evaluations of the most valued consumption periods to less desirable consumption periods (i.e. 
last day and anticipated worst day). 
There are several alternative explanations that are explored in this study.  First, it is 
possible that narrow periodic pricing could make the first or best day seem better due to 
increased attention to that day.  Additionally, although this result would not necessarily be 
predicted, it is possible that the narrow periodic price frame could encourage consumers to adopt 
a lower level construal (Trope and Liberman 2010; Fiedler 2007).  A lower level construal could 
potentially make the contract seem more or less attractive, depending on which features of the 
contract are represented in the low-level construal.  Finally, the effects could result from 
cognitive capacity limitations or financial literacy limitations, which both could differentially 
impact narrow and broad periodic price framing.  In addition to assessing these competing 
explanations, this study removes the prompt for consumers to think about or report the benefits 
associated with the contract.  This allows testing whether periodic pricing expands perceived 







In this study, 321 Mechanical Turk participants completed a questionnaire that was 
broadly similar to Study 2.  As before, participants were told about an opportunity to lease one of 
several luxury vehicles.  Although everyone was evaluating a 36-month lease that involved 
payments that would be automatically deducted from his or her monthly paycheck, this cost was 
framed as either $20 per day (periodic price frame) or $7,250 per year (aggregate price frame).  
Participants were then asked for the likelihood that they would agree to pay the amount 
requested, on a scale from 0 (not at all likely) to 10 (extremely likely). 
After completing the main choice task, participants first completed two blocks of 
questions that helped determine whether narrow periodic pricing improved the first/best day, 
last/worst day, or changed their construal level.  The first component asked participants to rate, 
“If you agreed to the amount requested, how satisfied do you expect to be on…” four different 
days.  These included the first day, the most satisfying day over the next year, the last day, and 
the least satisfying day over the next year.  Each of these were answered on 11-point scales 
ranging from 0 (not at all satisfying) to 10 (extremely satisfying) and they were presented in 
random order.  Additionally, construal level was assessed using a short-form (4-item) behavioral 
identification form, and these two components were presented in random order. 
Finally, participants completed a short-form (4-item) financial/debt literacy scale and 
short-form (5-item) numerical reasoning scale.  All scales were developed on the basis of pretest 
data that used a sample similar to the test pool.  Details on scale construction appear in Appendix 
II-D. In the main experiment, the scales were presented in random order and the items within 







     Analyses of possible alternative influences on purchase intentions.  Neither numerical 
ability, financial literacy, nor purchase intentions were expected to be affected by the payment 
frame.  These were also not expected interact with the payment frame to influence consumers’ 
purchase intentions.  Neither numerical ability nor financial literacy varied across conditions 
(yearly vs. daily frame; Fs(1,319) <= 1), and separate ANOVAs found that neither interacted 
with frame to influencing purchase intentions (Fs(1,317) = 0.03). However, individual 
differences in numerical ability and financial literacy each predicted purchase intentions 
(numerical ability: F(1,317) = 6.69, p = 0.01; financial literacy: F(1,317) = 15.26, p = 0.001).   
 There were no specific predictions about how construal level would relate to purchase 
intentions.  The results suggest that level of abstraction did not differ across conditions (F(1,319) 
< 1).  There was also no main effect of construal level on purchase intention, and no interaction 
between frame and construal level (F(1,317) < 1).  
     Analyses of the role of anticipated benefits on purchase intentions.  Next, analysis 
turns to the relationship between payment frame and evaluations of particular days, and how 
those ratings accounted for the relationship between payment frame and purchase intentions.  
The price frame influenced satisfaction on the least satisfied and last day (least: Myearly = 3.26, 
SD = 2.56; Mdaily = 3.78, SD = 2.54; F(1,319) = 3.42, p = 0.07; last: Myearly = 6.86, SD = 2.92; 
Mdaily = 7.49, SD = 2.64; F(1,319) = 4.09, p = 0.04) but not the most satisfied nor first day (most: 
Myearly = 8.43, SD = 1.76; Mdaily = 8.55, SD = 1.87; F(1,319) = 0.32, p = 0.57; first: Myearly = 
7.63, SD = 2.31; Mdaily = 7.86, SD = 2.40; F(1,319) = 0.78, p = 0.38).  In a regression, these daily 
ratings, considered jointly, each predicted purchase intentions (βmost = 0.34, SE = 0.09, p < 0.001;  







.  Controlling for financial literacy, numeracy and level abstraction, the daily ratings 
again each predict purchase intentions (βmost = 0.40, SE = 0.10 , p < 0.001;  βleast = 0.43, SE = 
0.06, p < 0.001; βfirst = 0.20, SE = 0.07, p = 0.004; βlast = 0.21, SE = 0.06, p < 0.001).  In that 
regression, financial literacy predicts purchase intentions but abstraction and numerical ability do 
not (βflit = -1.31, SE = 0.52, p = 0.01 ;  βabst = -0.32, SE = 0.42, p = 0.45; βnum = -0.05, SE = 0.55, 
p = 0.93). 
     Next the analysis evaluated the indirect effect of payment frame on purchase intention 
as mediated through the four day ratings.  This series of equations also included level of 
abstraction as a mediator, and controlled for financial literacy and numerical ability.  Indirect 
effects were calculated based on coefficients for simultaneously estimated SUR regressions, 
bootstrapping 5000 times.  As shown in Figure II-4, ratings of the last day and least day 
directionally mediated the relationship between payment frame and purchase intentions (βlast = 
0.13, 95% CI = {-0.02, 0.27}, p < 0.10; βleast = 0.22, 95% CI = {-0.03, 0.47}, p = 0.08).  The first 
day, best day and level of abstraction each did not mediate the relationship between payment 
frame and purchase intentions (βfirst = 0.05, 95% CI = {-0.07, 0.16}, p = 0.43; βbest = 0.05, 95% 
CI = {-0.12, 0.21}, p = 0.59).  These factors together fully mediated the effect of payment frame 
on purchase intentions.  A second mediation model additionally controlled for numerical ability 
in the effect of the payment frame on the daily ratings and abstraction.  In this model, the indirect 
effects remained roughly similar in size but the indirect effect of the last day and least satisfying 
day strengthened statistically (βlast = 0.14, 95% CI = {-0.01, 0.28}, p = 0.07; βleast = 0.25, 95% CI 
= {0.00, 0.49}, p < 0.05). 
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is a valid concern regarding multicollinearity.  These inflation factors were all low (all below 1.5) and are 






Study 5 replicates the results of Study 2 without the explicit prompt to think about or 
report benefits.  In other words, consumers spontaneously think about the contract’s benefits 
differently following a periodic or aggregate price frame.  Consequently, an explicit prompt to 
think about the contract’s benefits is not necessary for narrow periodic pricing to increase 
contract compliance in the non-trivial cost domain. 
 
Figure II-4. Mediating Payment Frame and Lease Intentions, Redux 
Daily price frame increases lease intentions by improving perceptions of last, least day. 
 
Additionally, Study 5 provides further evidence in support of Hypothesis II-4 over 
several plausible alternate explanations.  Narrowly-framed periodic prices increase purchase 
likelihood by improving how consumers perceive the least desirable and temporally distant days 





consistent with consumers extending their per-day product evaluation across all days rather than 
by improving the evaluations of immediately accessible days.  The evidence also suggests that 
the observed periodic pricing effects do not happen because of a change in overall construal level 
or apply to only concrete or abstract thinkers.  Further, neither numerical ability nor financial 
literacy can account for consumers’ improved contract evaluations following narrow periodic 
pricing.  Finally, such periodic pricing effects are not constrained to only individuals with low or 
high numerical ability or financial literacy.  This evidence suggests that the effect of narrow 
periodic pricing on contract evaluations is likely not driven by peculiarities of the sample and 
rules out several alternate explanations.  
 
General Discussion 
This essay proposes a novel account of why consumers agree to contracts when the price 
is framed as a series of periodic payments.  Previous accounts have focused on how periodic 
costs are affordable only if a representative cost assimilates with the set of small, recurring 
expenses.  The data supplements and extends this model, finding that framing a contract’s 
tangible cost narrowly (e.g. per-day pricing) causes consumers to represent corresponding 
intangible benefits narrowly, and this often magnifies the contract’s benefits.  In addition to 
offering a novel account of the pennies-a-day phenomenon, the new account predicts cases when 
periodic pricing fails to increase purchase despite having a trivial cost as well as when periodic 
pricing succeeds despite non-trivial periodic payments. 
 The data provide empirical support for some new predictions that cannot be explained 
through the extant pennies-a-day paradigm.  First, narrowly framing a contract’s price doesn’t 





benefits from the contract.  There is also evidence that the greater anticipated benefits are not 
explained by decreased price perceptions.  Next, the results suggest that the effects of periodic 
pricing are not restricted to the domain of trivial costs. 
 The third study identifies when periodic pricing increases purchase likelihood by 
considering the role of scope-insensitivity: narrow framing works when the first unit carries the 
greatest benefit.  Finally, process evidence provides an understanding of how per-day pricing 
changes the representation of future benefits associated with the periodic payments.  There is 
evidence that periodic pricing improves how consumers perceive overlooked consumption events 
rather than increasing focal consumption events.  The new findings are consistent with previous 
findings that consumers are sensitive to the size of a set when set size information is salient and 
interpretable, and consumers pay attention to it (Kahneman, Ritov and Schkade 1999). 
 The results violate the concept of “descriptive invariance” from standard economic 
theory, which predicts that different descriptions of the same stimuli should not affect 
preferences (Tversky, Sattath and Slovic 1988).  Additionally, the results provide evidence that 
the valuation of gains and losses are not separable, in violation of a core assumption of Prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and Cumulative Prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 
1992).  Similar separability violations have been found for decisions involving risk (Wu and 
Markle 2008). 
 The current results are generally consistent with the notion that tightly coupling payments 
with consumption provides hedonic value but it is not clear whether such framing improves 
decision quality.  The results support the notion that pain of paying is offset when thinking about 
payments calls to mind thoughts about benefits (Prelec and Loewenstein 1998).  The tight 





frame better represent a consumer’s “true” preferences—e.g., preferences for products consumed 
daily where less satiation occurs than consumers expect.  This research is agnostic as to which 
elicitation procedure gives rise to normatively correct responses. 
Future research could extend this research to test an extension of the theory proposed 
here.  The present work focuses on contracts involving benefits that are relatively scope-
insensitive, yet consumers vary in their scope-insensitivity to payments according to individual 
differences (Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen 2010) and contextual factors (Hsee, Rottenstreich 
and Xiao 2005).  In cases where people are more scope-insensitive to payments than the 
commensurate benefits, reframing a cost as periodic payments may backfire. 
 
Managerial Implications 
This research offers novel insights for marketing managers who seek guidance about 
when to present prices as periodic.  Previous research suggests that periodic prices should only 
be used when the resulting price calls to mind a trivial amount of money.  In contrast, this 
research suggests that regardless of cost triviality, framing price as a recurring event over time 
helps consumers appreciate the large benefits from products or services that offer many recurring 
small benefits.  Consequently, marketers should not limit themselves to framing prices on a per-
day basis when the resulting payment is seen as trivial, and can instead use periodic prices as a 
general strategy across price levels. 
This research also offers guidance about when periodic pricing is most effective.  
Marketers should use periodic prices whenever they expect that consumers will value the first 
few consumption events more highly than other consumption events.  This pattern is likely to fit 





use a product or service, and/or (c) when marketers expect consumers to quickly satiate to a 
product.  Additionally, it is likely to fit (d) when marketers anticipate that their target customers 
lack the ability or context to fully appreciate the full magnitude offered by a product or service 
contract that extends over time or across many units.  Under these conditions, periodic pricing 
presented in conjunction with emphasis on the highly valued unit can encourage consumers to 















Summary of Results 
 This dissertation investigates how consumers evaluate consumer financial decisions with 
consequences that recur over time.  Recurring financial consequences differ from one-time 
events in that the consequences are explicitly distributed across time.  The dissertation first 
explores the role of individual differences in intertemporal preferences in this domain, and then 
investigates how consumers account differently for recurring and one-time financial events.  The 
two essays together suggest that contracts involving recurring financial events are mentally 
represented differently from those with one-time financial events, and that content is then 
discounted based on intertemporal preferences. 
The first essay examines the relationship between intertemporal preferences and 
mortgage choices.  This project augments a survey of 244 mortgaged homeowners with zip code 
level data on the local housing market to examine how present bias and exponential discounting 
relate with mortgage choices leading to negative home equity and strategic once underwater.  It 
finds that both present bias and exponential discounting lead to negative home equity, and while 
exponential discounting encourages homeowners to walk away once underwater, present bias 
leads them to resist strategic default.  These results are robust to several controls including 
components of risk preferences, individual and market-level controls and several alternate model 
specifications. These findings are further reinforced by evidence, in both the survey and a 
reference data set, that intertemporal preferences also relate with several precursors of 
underwater mortgages, net home equity and net worth.  Additional analysis casts doubt on a 
number of alternate explanations. 
The second essay examines how consumers view a transaction’s benefits differently 





proposes and finds that recurring costs tend to encourage consumers to “book” a transaction’s 
recurring benefits more frequently.  So when consumers are insensitive to scope for the 
transaction’s benefits, they tend to view a transaction as having more benefits if the price is 
framed on a recurring basis. 
Together, these essays suggest that individual differences and situational cues influence 
decisions involving recurring financial events.  In particular, understanding intertemporal 
preferences provide useful and nuanced insight into these decisions.  But to understand how 
these individual differences will impact how consumers react to a proposed contract, marketers 
must understand the meaning consumers attach to the financial events.  So, for example, when 
evaluating a mortgage, consumers are thinking not only of the financial consequences but also of 
the hardship to their families from having to move in the short run.  Taken in context, the choice 
of whether to present a recurring financial event or its aggregate equivalent itself influences how 
consumers make choices in this domain, and marketers should choose the frame carefully. 
 
Future Research Directions 
 There are a number of open research questions related to the topics pursued in this 
dissertation.  Using behavioral models is a growing area in consumer finance, and incorporating 
individual differences of time preferences into models of financial decision making provides 
opportunities to develop financial products that segment and/or target consumers.  Understanding 
time preferences are most valuable however, with a complete picture of the meaning consumers 
affix to financial events (e.g. v(x) in equation I-2), and future research should examine not only 
time preferences in other financial domains but also develop new methods to understand how 






 Another open research area is to better understand when is “now.”  Essay I applies a 
quasihyperbolic discounting function because it fits differences in consumer preferences well 
while requiring only a single additional parameter.  Quasihyperbolic discounting models have, 
however, ranged dramatically in what period comprises “now.”  For example, Laibson (1997) 
and Angeletos et al. (2001) estimate a present bias that discounts all consumption after this year, 
while Tanaka et al (2010) estimate a present bias that discounts all consumption after today.  
This difference was not important in the present research because it treats the elicited 
intertemporal preferences as summaries of more complex cognitive processes.  However, future 
research should examine this more closely, as just as there have been differences between 
researchers in how to conceptualize “now”, there may be relevant individual differences in and 
contextual influences on the time frame considered to be “now,” and this may be an important 
factor in consumer financial decisions. 
Another future research direction is how the recurring and one-time financial events 
cause different content to be recalled from memory.  For example, it may be interesting to 
examine the results of the Essay II in the context of Query theory (Johnson et al. 2007; Weber et 
al. 2007).  Query theory posits that contextual cues influence how preferences are constructed 
because initial thoughts interfere with the recall of subsequent thoughts. The results from this 
essay are consistent with an account where the contextual cues influence the initial queries (such 
as thoughts about a transaction’s total or periodic costs) which alter later queries (leading to 
thoughts about a transaction’s total or periodic benefits).  Collecting and evaluating the content, 
order and frame of thoughts would enable further exploration of this research in the context of 





presentation of daily/yearly costs would help demonstrate that the cost frame is used as a cue for 
how to mentally account for prospective benefits.   
Essay II also suggests a wide range of research directions outside the scope of this 
dissertation.  For example, in theory the prediction that more frequent payment events increases 
purchase will reverse when consumers are more scope insensitive to the transaction’s costs than 
they are to the transaction’s benefits.  For example, if consumers are evaluating a transaction 
involving highly emotional costs and calculable benefits, consumers may evaluate the transaction 
more highly under an aggregate frame.  Additionally, the present research is limited to 
prospective evaluations, and further work could explore how periodic pricing influences 
retrospective evaluations by explicitly adding a knowledge/memory component to the model. 
 
Conclusion 
 In closing, this dissertation examined the role of two factors in how consumers evaluate 
financial decisions with consequences that recur over time, which by nature are consequential to 
consumer welfare.  First this dissertation explores how individual differences in intertemporal 
preferences influence consumer choices in this domain.  The second essay explores how event 
frequency changes what consumers bring to mind about a contract, independent from their 
intertemporal preferences.  Consequently, the decision of whether to present financial events 
from periodic prices to annuitized payments must consider both the change to when the payment 







Ainslie, George, “Specious Reward: A Behavioral Theory of Impulsiveness and Impulse 
Control,” Psychological Bulletin, 82 (1975), 463-496. 
Andersen, Steffen, Glenn W. Harrison, Morten L. Lau, and Elisabet E. Rutstrom, "Estimating 
Risk and Time Preferences," Econometrica, 76 (2008), 583-618. 
Angeletos, George-Marios, David Laibson, Andrea Repetto, Jeremy Tobacman, and Stephen 
Weinberg, "The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: Calibration, Simulation, and Empirical 
Evaluation," The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15 (2001), 47-68. 
Ashraf, Nava, Dean Karlan, and Wesley Yin, "Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence from a 
Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 40 
(2006), 635-672. 
Baron, Jonathan, and Joshua Greene, "Determinants of insensitivity to quantity in valuation of 
public goods: Contribution, warm glow, budget constraints, availability, and 
prominence," Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 2 (1996), 107-125. 
Benhabib, Jess, Alberto Bisin, and Andrew Schotter, "Present-Bias, Quasi-Hyperbolic 
Discounting, and Fixed Costs," Games and Economic Behavior, 69 (2010), 205-223. 
Bernartzi, S., and R. H. Thaler, “Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (1995), 75-92. 
Browning, Martin and Jeremy Tobacman, "Discounting and Optimism Equivalences," (2007). 
Bucks, Brian, and Karen Pence, "Do Borrowers Know Their Mortgage Terms?" Journal of 





Campbell, John Y., and João F. Cocco, "Household Risk Management and Optimal Mortgage 
Choice," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118 (2003), 1449-1494. 
Campbell, John Y., and João F. Cocco, "A Model of Mortgage Default," National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper Series, No. 17516 (2011). 
Carroll, G.D., J.J. Choi, D Laibson, B.C. Madrian, and A. Metrick, "Optimal Defaults and Active 
Decisions," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124 (2009), 1639-1674. 
Chabris, Christopher F., David Laibson, Carrie L. Morris, Jonathon P. Schuldt, and Dmitry 
Taubinsky, "Individual Laboratory-Measured Discount Rates Predict Field Behavior," 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 37 (2008), 237-269. 
Chapman, Gretchen B., "Temporal Discounting and Utility for Health and Money," J Exp 
Psychol Learn, 22 (1996), 771-791. 
DellaVigna, Stefano , and Ulrike Malmendier, "Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and 
Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (2004), 353-402. 
DellaVigna, Stefano and Ulrike Malmendier, “Paying Not to Go to the Gym,” American 
Economic Review, 96 (2006), 694-719. 
DellaVigna, Stefano, and M.  Daniele Paserman, "Job Search and Impatience," Journal of Labor 
Economics, 23 (2005), 527-588. 
Desvousges, William H., Institute Research Triangle, and Corporation Exxon, Measuring nonuse 
damages using contingent valuation : an experimental evaluation of accuracy (Research 
Triangle Park, N.C.: Research Triangle Institute], 1992). 
Eigsti, Inge-Marie, Vivian Zayas, Walter Mischel, Yuichi Shoda, Ozlem Ayduk, Mamta B. 





Control From Preschool to Late Adolescence and Young Adulthood," Psychological 
Science, 17 (2006), 478-484. 
Federal Reserve, “Part 2: Recent Economic and Financial Developments,” Monetary Policy 
Report to the Congress, Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
(2012a), July 17. 
Federal Reserve, “The U.S. Housing Market: Current Conditions and Policy Implications, White 
Paper, (2012b) [http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/housing-
white-paper-20120104.pdf], Accessed on 10/26/2012. 
Fiedler, Klaus, "Construal Level Theory as an Integrative Framework for Behavioral Decision-
Making Research and Consumer Psychology," Journal of Consumer Psychology, 17 
(2007), 101-106. 
Figner, Bernd, Daria Knoch, Eric J. Johnson, Amy R. Krosch, Sarah H. Lisanby, Ernst Fehr, and 
Elke U. Weber, "Lateral Prefrontal Cortex and Self-Control in Intertemporal Choice," 
Nature Neuroscience, 13 (2010), 538-539. 
Foote, Christopher L., Kristopher Gerardi, and Paul S. Willen, "Negative Equity and 
Foreclosure: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Urban Economics, 64 (2008), 234-245. 
Frederick, Shane, "Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making," Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 19 (2005), 25-42. 
Frederick, Shane, Personal Communication, Yale School of Management, US, (2012). 
Frederick, S., and B. Fischhoff, "Scope (in) sensitivity in elicited valuations," Risk Decision and 
Policy, 3 (1998), 109-123. 
Frederick, Shane, George Loewenstein, and Ted O'Donoghue, "Time Discounting and Time 





Frederick, Shane, Nathan Novemsky, Jing Wang, and Ravi Dhar, “Opportunity Cost Neglect,” 
Journal of Consumer Research, 36 (2009), 553-561. 
Genesove, D, and C Mayer, "Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior: Evidence from the Housing 
Market*," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116 (2001), 1233-1260. 
Gilpatric, Scott M., “Slippage in Rebate Programs and Present-Biased Preferences,” Marketing 
Science, 28 (2009), 229-238. 
Gourville, John T., "Pennies-a-Day: The Effect of Temporal Reframing on Transaction 
Evaluation," The Journal of Consumer Research, 24 (1998), 395-408. 
Gourville, John T., "The Effect of Implicit versus Explicit Comparisons on Temporal Pricing 
Claims," Marketing Letters, 10 (1999), 113-124. 
Gourville, John T., "The Effects of Monetary Magnitude and Level of Aggregation on the 
Temporal Framing of Price," Marketing Letters, 14 (2003), 125-135. 
Graham, John R., and Campbell R. Harvey, "The Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance: 
Evidence from the Field," Journal of Financial Economics, 60 (2001), 187-243. 
Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, Luigi Zingales, "The Determinants of Attitudes towards Strategic 
Default on Mortgages," (2010). 
Hausman, Jerry, “Individual Discount Rates and the Purchase and Utilization of Energy-Using 
Durables,” Bell Journal of Economics, 10 (1979), 33-54. 
Harrison, Glen W., Morten I. Lau and Melonie B. Williams, “Estimating Individual Discount 
Rates in Denmark,” American Economic Review, 92 (2002), 1606-1617. 
Heidhues, Paul, and Botond Koszegi, "Exploiting Naivete about Self-Control in the Credit 





Hsee, CK, Y Rottenstreich, and Z Xiao, "When Is More Better?," Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 14 (2005), 234. 
Hsee, Chrisopher K., George F. Loewenstein, Sally Blount, and Max H. Bazerman, "Preference 
reversals between joint and separate evaluations of options: A review and theoretical 
analysis," Psychological Bulletin, 125 (1999), 576-590. 
Hsee, Christopher K., and Yuval Rottenstreich, "Music, Pandas, and Muggers: On the Affective 
Psychology of Value," Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133 (2004), 23-30. 
Johnson, E. J., G. Haubl, and A. Keinan, "Aspects of endowment: A query theory of value 
construction," Journal of Experimental Psychology-Learning Memory and Cognition, 33 
(2007), 461-474. 
Johnson, Eric J., and Christopher Mayer, "2/28 Mortgages:  When Business and Psychology 
Intersect in New Consumer Products,"  (New York: Columbia CaseWorks, Columbia 
Business School, Columbia University, 2011). 
Kable, Joseph W., and Paul W. Glimcher, "The Neural Correlates of Subjective Value During 
Intertemporal Choice," Nature Neuroscience, 10 (2007), 1625-1633. 
Kahneman, Daniel, and Jack L. Knetsch, "Valuing public goods: The purchase of moral 
satisfaction," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 22 (1992), 57-70. 
Kahneman, Daniel, Ilana Ritov, and David Schkade, "Economic Preferences or Attitude 
Expressions?: An Analysis of Dollar Responses to Public Issues," Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty, 19 (1999), 203-235. 
Kahneman, D., and A. Tversky, "Prospect Theory - Analysis of Decision under Risk," 





Kirby, Kris N., and R.J. Herrnstein, "Preference Reversals Due to Myopic Discounting of 
Delayed Reward," Psychological Science, 6 (1995), 83-89. 
Krueger, Lester E., "Reconciling Fechner and Stevens: Toward a unified psychophysical law," 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 12 (1989), 251-267. 
Laibson, David, "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
112 (1997), 443-477. 
Lambrecht, Anja and Catherine Tucker, “Paying With Money or With Effort: Pricing When 
Customers Anticipate Hassle,” Journal of Marketing Research, 49 (2012), 66-82. 
Linville, Patricia W., and Gregory W. Fischer, "Preferences for separating or combining events," 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60 (1991), 5-23. 
Lipkus, Isaac M., Greg Samsa, and Barbara K. Rimer, "General Performance on a Numeracy 
Scale among Highly Educated Samples," Medical Decision Making, 21 (2001), 37-44. 
Loan Value Group, “Loan Value Group Launches RHReward.com to Educate Responsible 
Homeowners on New Reward Program,” (http://www.marketwire.com/press-
release/Loan-Value-Group-Launches-RHRewardcom-Educate-Responsible-
Homeowners-on-New-Reward-Program-1135309.htm), (2010). 
Loewenstein, George F., "Frames of Mind in Intertemporal Choice," Management Science, 34 
(1988), 200-214. 
Loewenstein, George F., and Sicherman, N. “Do Workers Prefer Increasing Wage Profiles?” 
Journal of Labor Economics, 9, 67-84. 
Loewenstein, George F., and Richard. H. Thaler, "Anomalies - Intertemporal Choice," Journal of 





Lusardi, Annamaria, and Peter Tufano, "Debt Literacy, Financial Experiences, and 
Overindebtedness," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, No. 
14808 (2009). 
Lusardi, Annamaria, and Olivia S. Mitchell, "Financial Literacy and Planning: Implications for 
Retirement Wellbeing," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, 
No. 17078 (2011). 
Machado, Fernando, and Rajiv K. Sinha (2007), “Smoking Cessation: Planned versus Actual 
Behavior for Time-Inconsistent Consumers,” Marketing Sceience, 26 (2007), 834-850. 
Mackinnon, Andrew, Anthony F. Jorm, Helen Christensen, Ailsa E. Korten, Patricia A. Jacomb, 
and Bryan Rodgers, "A short form of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule: 
evaluation of factorial validity and invariance across demographic variables in a 
community sample," Personality and Individual Differences, 27 (1999), 405-416. 
Mayer, Christopher, Karen Pence, and Shane M. Sherlund, "The Rise in Mortgage Defaults," 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23 (2009), 27-50. 
McClure, Samuel M., David I. Laibson, George Loewenstein, and Jonathan D. Cohen, "Separate 
Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed Monetary Rewards," Science, 306 (2004), 
503-507. 
McClure, Samuel M., Keith M. Ericson, David I. Laibson, George Loewenstein, and Jonathan D. 
Cohen, "Time Discounting for Primary Rewards," The Journal of Neuroscience, 27 
(2007), 5796-5804. 
McFadden, Daniel and Gregory Leonard, Issues in the Contingent Valuation of Environmental 





1993).Meier, Stephan, and Charles Sprenger, "Present-Biased Preferences and Credit 
Card Borrowing," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2 (2010), 193-210. 
Meier, Stephan, and Charles D. Sprenger, "Time Discounting Predicts Creditworthiness," 
Psychological Science, (2011). 
Mian, Atif, and Amir Sufi, "The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion:  Evidence from 
the US Mortgage Default Crisis," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124 (2009), 1449-
1496. 
O'Donoghue, Ted, and Matthew Rabin, "Choice and Procrastination," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 116 (2001), 121-160. 
Paserman, M. Daniele, "Job Search and Hyperbolic Discounting: Structural Estimation and 
Policy Evaluation*," The Economic Journal, 118 (2008), 1418-1452. 
Phelps, E.S. and R.A. Pollak, “On Second-Best National Saving and Game-Equilibrium 
Growth,” Review of Economic Studies, 35 (1968), 185-199. 
Preacher, Kristopher J., and Andrew F. Hayes, “Asymptotic and Resampling Strategies for 
Assessing and Comapring Indirect Effects in Multiple Mediator Models,” Behavior 
research methods, 40 (2008), 879-891. 
Prelec, Drazen, "The Probability Weighting Function," Econometrica, 66 (1998), 497-527. 
Prelec, D. and G. Loewenstein, “Beyond Time Discounting,” Marketing Letters, 8, (1997), 97-
108. 
Prelec, D., and G. Loewenstein, "The Red and the Black: Mental Accounting of Savings and 
Debt," Marketing Science, 17 (1998), 4-28. 
Read, Daniel, George Loewenstein, and Matthew Rabin, "Choice Bracketing," Journal of Risk 





Reimers, Stian, Elizabeth A. Maylor, Neil Stewart, and Nick Chater, "Associations Between a 
One-Shot Delay Discounting Measure and Age, Income, Education and Real-World 
Impulsive Behavior," Personality and Individual Differences, 47 (2009), 973-978. 
RHReward.com, “How Do RH Rewards Work?” (http://www.rhreward.com/howworks) Loan 
Value Group LLC, (2010). 
Samuelson, Paul, “A Note on Measurement of Utility,” Review of Economic Studies, 4, (1937), 
155-161. 
Slovic, Paul, "Psychological Study of Human Judgment: Implications for Investment Decision-
Making," Journal of Finance, 27 (1972), 779-799. 
Spiller, Stephen A., Gavan J. Fitzsimons, John G. Lynch, Jr., and Gary H. McClelland, 
“Spotlights, Floodlights, and the Magic Number Zero: Simple Effects Tests in Moderated 
Regression,” Journal of Marketing Research, (2013), forthcoming. 
Tanaka, Tomomi, Colin F. Camerer, and Quang Nguyen, "Risk and Time Preferences:   
Experimenal and Household Data from Vietnam.," American Economic Review, (2010). 
Thaler, Richard H., “Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice,” Marketing Science, 4 (1985), 
199-214. 
Thaler, Richard H., "Mental Accounting Matters," Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 12 
(1999), 183-206. 
Thaler, Richard H., and Eric J. Johnson, "Gambling with the House Money and Trying to Break 






Toubia, Olivier, Eric J. Johnson, Theodoros Evgeniou, and Philippe Delquié, " Dynamic 
Experiments for Estimating Preferences:  An Adaptive Method of Eliciting Time and 
Risk Parameters," Management Science, in press (2012). 
Trope, Y., and N. Liberman, "Construal-level theory of psychological distance," Psychological 
Review, 117 (2010), 440. 
Tukey, John W. Exploratory Data Analysis, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, (1977). 
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman, "Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (1991), 1039-1061. 
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman, "Advances in Prospect-Theory - Cumulative 
Representation of Uncertainty," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5 (1992), 297-323. 
Tversky, A., S. Sattath, and P. Slovic, "Contingent Weighting in Judgment and Choice," 
Psychological Review, 95 (1988), 371-384. 
Vallacher, Robin R., and Daniel M. Wegner, "Levels of personal agency: Individual variation in 
action identification," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57 (1989), 660-671. 
Weber, Elke U., Eric J. Johnson, Kerry. F. Milch, Hannah Chang, Jeff C. Brodscholl, and Daniel 
G. Goldstein, "Asymmetric Discounting in Intertemporal Choice," Psychological 
Science, 18 (2007), 516-523. 
White, Brent T., "Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear and the Social Management 
of the Housing Crisis," SSRN eLibrary, (2010). 
Wu, G., and A. B. Markle, "An Empirical Test of Gain-Loss Separability in Prospect Theory," 
Management Science, 54 (2008), 1322-1335. 
Zauberman, Gal, "The Intertemporal Dynamics of Consumer Lock-In," Journal of Consumer 





Zellner, Arnold, and H Theil, "Three Stage Least Squares: Simultaneous Estimation of 
Simultaneous Equations," Econometrica, 29 (1962), 54-78. 
Zhao, Xinshu , John G  Lynch Jr, and Qimei Chen, "Reconsidering Baron and Kenny: Myths and 
Truths about Mediation Analysis," Journal of Consumer Research, 37 (2010), 197-206. 
Zillow.com, “Zillow Negative Equity Report: June 2012 (Q2),” (2012) 
[http://zillow.mediaroom.com/file.php/1478/Zillow+Neg+Equity+Report_Q2+UPDATE








Appendix I-A. A Simple Model Motivating Predictions About Time Preferences and 
Mortgage Choices 
Time Preferences and Underwater Mortgages 
Consider a simple discrete 3-period model in which a prospective homeowner (agent) 
with quasihyperbolic time preferences characterized by present bias (low β) and exponential 
discounting (low δ), where  β , δ   (   ), is deciding between two mortgages that are each 
repaid over two time periods beyond the present (Period 0).  The agent can choose to make a 
larger payment in the present (a “front-loaded mortgage”) or during Period 1 and Period 2 (a 
“back-loaded mortgage”).  Following Campbell and Cocco (2003), it is assumed that future 
consumption events are separable in utility, and assume no ex post inflation uncertainty and risk 
neutrality.  The model concerns only consumers who are naïve to the consequences of their time 
preferences.  Their preferences for each option can be with the following utility functions: 
(I-A1a)    (                    )                  
    
(I-A1b)    (                   )                  
    
Here    and    are the initial costs of the two mortgages and f and b reflect their periodic 
payments, with   ,   , f, b   [0,∞).  Since, by definition the front-loaded mortgage has a larger 
initial payment than the latter,         Importantly, this leaves a greater loan balance for the 
back-loaded mortgage.  Since this must be repaid,    . 31  This setup can be thought of as 
capturing the decision to put more money down or to pay a larger monthly mortgage payment, 
                                                          
31
 Back-loaded repayment would be even more costly (relative to front-loaded repayment) if the lender 





analogous to the choice between a standard 30-year mortgage and a 2/28 loan. While this model 
illustrates how time preferences motivate mortgage choices with two periods beyond the present, 
the logic holds when homeowners pay f and b over any number of periods. 
The agent will choose the front-loaded mortgage if U(Front) U(back).  This suggests 
the boundary   
  such that, as shown in the below diagram, the agent would select the front-
loaded mortgage for all values if      
 and the back-loaded mortgage if      
 .  In other 
words, higher   
  values correspond with a greater willingness to pay for front-loaded mortgages 
instead of back-loaded mortgages.  
           
          
|--------------------|--------------------)    
                  {Pick Front}       {Pick Back} 
Accordingly, by combining equation I-A1a and I-A1b for when  (     )   (    ) 
and rearranging: 
(I-A2)      
       (   )    
 (   )    
Recall that the present research is interested in understanding how willingness to pay for 
up-front mortgages changes based on time preferences.  This relationship can be understood by 
taking the partial derivatives of   
 relative to β and δ. 
(I-A3a) 
   
 
  
 (    )(   )   
(I-A3b) 
   
 
  
 (     )(   )      
 Equation I-A3 states that as    , agents are more willing to purchase back-loaded 
mortgages (i.e. higher   *) when they are present-biased (i.e. lower  ) and if they exponentially 






Hypothesis I-1: Present-biased and exponentially discounting agents (low   and  ) select more 
mortgages that enable them to delay payments than patient agents. For example, agents with 
    or     will back-load mortgages more willingly than agents with        
 
Time Preferences and Negative Home Equity 
A homeowner is underwater if his or her total debts exceed the market value of the home.  
Hence a homeowner can become underwater either having more debt or having a lower home 
market value.  As home values fall, homeowners who selected a back-loaded mortgage become 
underwater before homeowners with otherwise equivalent homes carrying front-loaded 
mortgages.  More formally, suppose the subsequent home’s market value, M [0,∞), is 
discovered only after the down payment is made.  At this time, a homeowner with the front-
loaded mortgage will owe 2f in mortgage debt, while the one with a back-loaded mortgage will 
owe 2b.  As      the homeowner with the back-loaded mortgage will owe more in mortgage 
debt than the homeowner with the front-loaded mortgage.  If     , the front-loaded mortgage 
holder is underwater.  Since the back-loaded mortgage holder owes more, the back-loaded 
mortgage holder must also be underwater.  In contrast, if     , while the back-loaded 
mortgage holder is underwater, one cannot conclude that the front-loaded mortgage holder is 
underwater as there exists an     such that        .  In other words, an underwater back-
loaded mortgage is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the front-loaded mortgage to be 
underwater.  Critically, as more impatient homeowners are in back-loaded mortgages, more 
impatient homeowners will get underwater before front-loaded mortgages.  The intuition is that 





homeowners to become underwater before those with less remaining debt. This leads to 
Hypothesis I-2. 
 
Hypothesis I-2: The mortgages selected by impatient agents (low   and  ) are more likely to 
become underwater following negative housing market shocks because back-loaded mortgages 
are repaid more slowly than front-loaded mortgages. 
 
To summarize, time preferences make predictions of the antecedents of being 
underwater: present-biased individuals may be more likely to buy a more expensive house given 
the same financial resources, to put less money down, to refinance the house, and to obtain a 
mortgage that has minimal upfront payments, such as a balloon or adjustable mortgage.  All 
these decisions are consistent with the notion of accelerating immediate gains by increasing 
delayed losses and can contribute to negative home equity. 
 
Time Preferences and Strategic Default 
The analyses above also apply to the strategic default decision. However, walking away 
produces one major difference in the structure of the decision. The initial loss in mortgage choice 
consists of economic costs such as the down payment, brokers’ fees, points, and non-economic 
costs, such as moving, which are offset by relocation into a new house. In contrast, if one were to 
abandon a mortgage, most of the costs (particularly the non-economic costs) are immediate and 
without an accompanying immediate gain. Immediate monetary costs and immediate non-
monetary costs of finding a rental unit, moving, potential changes of schools and loss of 





payment. Additional costs include social stigma or moral concerns (see Foote, Gerardi and 
Willen 2008 for a discussion of stigma and an economic model of strategic default). Individuals 
with more present bias are expected to overweight these costs and be less likely to walk away. 
Thus present-biased individuals may face a form of economic double jeopardy:  They are more 
likely to arrange a riskier mortgage, and are less likely to walk away from the consequences. In 
contrast, the delayed consequences of mortgage abandonment pit a near-term unattractive option 
(i.e., continued payment with no buildup of equity) with the longer-term benefits of potentially 
having positive equity and paying off the mortgage. The impact of individual differences in 
discounting will again depend on the structure of the long-term costs and benefits. 
The contrasting predictions of present bias and impatience for strategic default can be 
illustrated using a similar analysis.  Consider a homeowner with quasihyperbolic time 
preferences who decides whether to move or walk away.  This homeowner values staying in her 
home and continuing to make mortgage payments (m) as described by the following utility 
function: 
 (I-A4)    (    )                       
Here m is the mortgage payment, M is the expected residual home value after mortgage 
payments are complete, and β and δ again reflect time preferences.  These four values are all 
assumed to be positive, finite values, and it is assumed that borrowing against future home equity 
is not available.  Similarly, walking away is given by the following utility function: 
 (I-A5)    (    )          –                
 Where r is the periodic rent payment, s is the short-term cost of moving including both 
physical costs associated with changing residences and social stigma of defaulting.  The 





residual home value M* whereby the homeowner is indifferent between moving and staying.  
High values of M* correspond with greater willingness to walk, since there is a smaller range of 
residual home values where the homeowner finds it worthwhile to continue to pay the mortgage.   
In other words, a higher M* results in more strategic defaulting.  
More specifically, M* can be characterized by combining equations I-A4 and I-A5. 
 (I-A6)      
     
   
  
   
 
       
Taking partial derivatives shows that changes in time preferences, β and δ, influence the 
threshold value M* and hence, willingness to walk away. 
 (I-A7) 
   
  
 
      
    
 
 
   
  
 
   (     )
   
 
   
  
      
More present-unbiased people (i.e. higher  ) are more willing to walk away (higher M*) 
if 
   
  
  .  This occurs if      . In other words, more present-biased people are more 
willing to stay in an underwater home if the present-term costs associated with moving 
(including rent) exceed the periodic mortgage cost.  More impatient people (i.e. lower  ) are 
more willing to walk (higher M*) if 
   
  
  .  This occurs if     (
 
   
  ) .  Hence there 






              
In other words, present bias and exponential discounting have opposite relationships with 
walking away provided that the periodic savings from walking away (m-r) meets two conditions.  
First, present-biased homeowners are more likely to stay if the net present savings are positive, 





On the other hand, homeowners who exponentially discount more are more likely to walk away 






   ).  While the lower bound on periodic walkaway savings increases with both present bias 
and exponential discounting, both of conditions are met by range of periodic walkaway savings 
unless          This leads to the final hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis I-3: Homeowners who exponentially discount the future more (low  ) are more 
likely to default while present-biased homeowners (low  ) are less likely to default. 
 
This analysis suggests that individual differences in time preferences can play a role in 
mortgage choice and abandonment, but there are clearly other factors that can contribute to the 
overall understanding.   This is important; both because other factors can add to the ability to 







Appendix I-B. Descriptive Statistics from Survey of Mortgaged Homeowners 
Table I-A1. Variable Descriptions from Survey of Mortgaged Homeowners 
Variable Description Source Level Mean St. Dev. 
(DV) 
Underwater  
Self-assessment of home equity 
status.  Ranges from -2 to 2; 2 is 





Individual 0.14 1.42 
(DV) Walk-
Away Value 
Minimum (negative) amount 
home would need to change in 
value for mortgage 
abandonment.  Increases with 
willingness to walk.  Calculated 




Individual -141,292 135,622 
β Percent of value retained when a 
payment is not received today. 
Decreases with present bias, 




Individual 0.88 0.15 
δ Percent of value retained when a 
payment is delayed for one year.  
Decreases as exponential 
discounting increases, ranges 




Individual 0.43 0.27 
λ Loss aversion Main 
Survey; 
Calculated 
Individual 2.26 1.06 
α Probability Distortion Main 
Survey; 
Calculated 
Individual 0.74 0.29 
σ Diminishing Sensitivity Main 
Survey; 
Calculated 
Individual 0.64 0.28 
Age Respondent age Main 
Survey 
Individual 39.8 10.8 
Gender 1=Male Main 
Survey 
Individual 0.34 0.47 
Married 1= Married Main 
Survey 
Individual 0.82 0.38 
Income Yearly household income Main 
Survey 
Individual 95,539 56,007 
Race 1=Caucasian Main 
Survey 









1= Yes Main 
Survey 
Individual 0.67 0.47 
Has Graduate 
Degree 
1= Yes Main 
Survey 
Individual 0.27 0.45 
Employment 
Security 
-2 to 2; 2 is most secure Main 
Survey 




Combination of financial 
competency self-assessment and 
performance on  debt literacy 
items (ranges 0 to near 1). 
Main 
Survey 
Individual 0.39 0.22 
CRT Number of Cognitive Reflection 
Task items correct (out of 3). 
Main 
Survey 
Individual 1.14 1.08 
Morality 
Scale 
Degree to which respondent 
views mortgage default in moral 
terms, from 6 scale items.  
Ranges from -1 to 1. 
Main 
Survey 





Degree of social connection to 
strategic defaulters. Ranges from 
0 to 1, 1 is closest. 
Main 
Survey 
Individual 0.21 0.24 
Initial Home 
Cost 
Purchase price of home Main 
Survey 








Individual 286,906 463,218 
Adjustable 
Rate 
1 = Mortgage has adjustible 
interest rate; 0= Mortgage has 
fixed interest rate 
Main 
Survey 
Individual 0.18 0.39 
Has Second 
Mortgage 




Individual 0.34 0.47 
Years in 
Home 
Years since home purchase. Main 
Survey 












































Fraction increase or decrease 
expected in home values over 









Strength of confidence in 
housing market expectations (-2 
to 2; 2 is most confident) 
Main 
Survey 




Peak, for Zip 
Code 
Percent change in average home 
prices, ranges from 0.66 to 0. 
Zillow Zip Code -0.23 0.16 
Foreclosures, 
as Percent of 
Zip 
Homes in foreclosure, as percent 
of zipcode-level total. 
BlackBox Zip Code 0.41 0.33 
Short Sales, 
as Percent of 
Zip 
Homes in short sale, as percent 
of zipcode-level total. 
BlackBox Zip Code 0.04 0.04 
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Figure I-A1. Histograms of Intertemporal Preferences, by Home Equity Status 
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Appendix I-C. Time Preferences, Net Home Equity and Net Worth 
Introduction 
The first essay in this dissertation explores the relationship between intertemporal 
preferences and mortgage decisions.  It links intertemporal preferences with having negative 
home equity, mortgage precursors to negative home equity, and the decision about whether to 
strategically default on the mortgage.  The essay proposes that intertemporal preferences are a 
robust individual differences measure relevant to a wide array of consumer financial decisions 
and states.  This supplement tests the robustness of that claim by testing the relationship between 
intertemporal preferences and two additional components of a consumer’s financial situation, 
namely, net home equity among homeowners and net worth among all households.  Additionally, 
this supplement aims to provide additional insight into whether other factors qualify the 
relationship between intertemporal preferences and financial decisions.  This section will test a 
strict time preference account, where intertemporal preferences alone influence net home equity 
and net worth, and a qualified relationship between intertemporal preferences and financial states 
that is bounded by the degree of autonomy the consumer has in their choices. 
 
Method 
 This supplement analyzes market data collected from the representative sample of US 
households gathered in 2010 by the market research company, Strategic Business Insights (SBI).  
The analysis will run a series of survey-weighted regressions relating intertemporal preferences, 
net home equity among homeowners and net worth among both homeowners and 
nonhomeowners.  This relationship will be tested, through the same series of regressions used on 





namely, in turn, (1) without any controls, (2) controlling for loss aversion, (3) controlling for the 
demographic factors income, marital status, gender, age and education, (4) liquidity constraints 
(checking, savings account balances and credit card debt, all relative to income) and (5) all 
controls simultaneously.  All continuous varaibles are centered to the relevant population mean, 
which for net home equity is US homeowners and for net worth is US households.  The analysis 
will then turn to exploring interactions between the controls and intertemporal preferences to 
assess whether limitations to choices qualify to the general relationship. 
If patient intertemporal preferences increase net home equity and net worth, the 
relationship should be positive and should persist after the controls.  If time preferences alone 
explain these variables, the relationships should not be qualified by factors that restrict choice, 
but if time preferences explain these variables subject to constraints that consumers face, the 
relationship between intertemporal preferences and the financial states should weaken when 
consumer choice is constricted. 
 
Results 
 To provide context for the results, it is worth noting that homeowners and households 
have intertemporal discount rates that are dramatically more impatient than those typically 
assumed by economic models.  The average survey-weighted one-year discount rate among 
homeowners was 0.59 (SD 0.18), and the one-year discount rate among all households was 0.57 
(SD 0.18).  Homeowners had, on average $111,736 in net home equity  (SD 116,424), and 
households had, on average, $367,549 in net worth (SD 1,016,729). 
The data suggests that there is a relationship between intertemporal preferences, net home 





relating mortgaged homeowners’ net home equity with intertemporal preferences (β*δ).  The 
simple relationship is strongly positive (β=85,143 p<0.0001), meaning that a 10% decrease in 1-
year discounting (increased patience) corresponds with $8,514 more net home equity.  This 
relationship remains unchanged in magnitude and significance when controlling for loss aversion 
and liquidity.  However, the relationship nearly halves in size and reduces significance somewhat 
(p<0.01) when accounting for demographics.  Among these factors, age, education and income 
emerge as strongly related to net home equity.  As age, education and income increase, net home 
equity increases. 
To provide further insight into how context influences the expression of time preferences, 
the next set of regressions, summarized in Table I-A4, further investigate whether the 
relationship between intertemporal preferences and net home equity is qualified by individual 
differences in loss aversion, demographic factors or liquidity constraints.  When predicting net 
home equity, there is no interaction of intertemporal preferences with loss aversion (Column 1) 
nor with demographics (Column 2).  Intertemporal preferences do, however, interact with credit 
card debt as a fraction of income (β=-193,849, p<0.05), indicating that with higher liquidity 
constraints, the relationship between intertemporal preferences and net home equity weakens. 
This interaction remains marginally significant when controlling for loss aversion and 
demographics.  Floodlight analysis (Spiller, Fitzsimons, Lynch and McClelland, forthcoming) 
suggests that net home equity increases with patience if credit card debt is less than 23% of 
income, the maximum credit card debt such that the simple main effect of discounting on net 
home equity retains a p-value less than 0.05.  In other words, time preferences correspond with 





 Table I-A5 summarizes the results from the series of regressions relating net worth with 
intertemporal preferences.  The simple relationship is again large and strongly positive 
(β=1,043,250, p<0.0001), meaning that a 10% increase in patience over one year corresponds 
with having $104,325 more in net worth.  This relationship remains unchanged in magnitude and 
significance when controlling for loss aversion and liquidity.  When accounting for 
demographics, the relationship diminishes by more than 50%, though it remains strongly 
statistically significant (p<0.0001).  Among these factors, age and income emerge as strongly 
related to net worth.  As age and income increase, net worth increases. 
 Table I-A6 further explores whether the relationship between intertemporal preferences 
and net worth is qualified by interaction effects.  Notably, across regressions, the relationship 
between intertemporal preferences and net worth remains consistent for the average household 
despite the presence of interactions.  Yet the results do reveal some interactions between 
intertemporal preferences and other factors.  Column 1 shows that loss aversion does not interact 
with intertemporal preferences.  Column 2 shows that there is an interaction between 
intertemporal preferences and marital status (p<0.05), as well as with age (p<0.001) and with 
income (p<0.001), but not with gender nor with education, in predicting net worth.  In particular, 
the relationship between intertemporal preferences weakens for married people relative to 
unmarried people, and strengthens with age and income.  Column 3 shows that these interactions 
persist in magnitude and significance after dropping the insignificant interactions from the 
second regression.  Column 4 explores interactions between intertemporal preferences and 
measures of liquidity, finding an interaction between credit card debt as a percentage of income 
and intertemporal preferences on net worth (p<0.05).  This indicates that the relationship 





to income, which indicates less liquidity. Regression 6 is a combined model including all 
controls and significant interactions, and the interactions persist, in magnitude and significance, 
and in fact strengthen for the income-discounting and liquidity-discounting interactions 
(p’s<0.001).  
 Intertemporal preferences appear to consistently interact with factors restricting the range 
of choices available to a decision maker to predict net worth.  Being married reduces a person’s 
ability to express his or her time individual intertemporal preferences when making choices that 
will influence the household’s net worth.  The strengthening of the relationship between 
intertemporal preferences and net worth by aging can be interpreted as being the legacy effect of 
stable time preferences previous choices that increase present net worth.  Having more income 
increases autonomy, and the relationship between time preferences and net worth strengthens.  
When consumers have less liquidity, as operationalized by credit card debt as a fraction of 
income, the relationship between intertemporal preferences and net worth weakens.  Taken 
together, these results are consistent with a view that consumers make financial choices 
reflecting their individual differences in intertemporal preferences subject to constraints by 
things outside their control that prevent their ability to express those preferences (such as having 
a second person in the household with time preferences of their own, having low income, low 
liquidity). 
  
Discussion and Conclusions 
 The evidence from the nationally representative SBI data indicates that, broadly, more 
patient intertemporal preferences are linked with greater net home equity and net worth.  This 





However the results further suggest a more nuanced view of the relationship between 
intertemporal preferences and financial states.  Statistically significant interactions between time 
preferences and marital status, age, income and credit card debt suggest that time preferences are 
particularly associated with financial states when circumstances enable their time preferences to 
impact financial choices.  In other words, patient preferences increase net home equity and net 
worth when consumers have the greatest ability to express those preferences in their financial 
choices. 
These findings should be qualified by the observation that the analysis came from a series 
of regressions, and as such one cannot rule out the possibility of reverse causality (e.g. net worth 
causes intertemporal preferences) nor that a third factor is driving observed intertemporal 
preferences as well as financial state.  However, taken at face value, the relationships found in 
this study are support both that patient intertemporal preferences correspond with greater net 
home equity and net worth and that these preferences are particularly relevant when consumers 
are able to express those preferences.  This result highlights that the introduction of new financial 
products to the marketplace, such as in the case of the 2-28 mortgage, has the potential to cause 
overall lifetime welfare harm by enabling consumers to better express impatient intertemporal 
discount rates.  Accordingly, while intertemporal discount rates provide a useful metric to 
segment and target consumers, marketers and policymakers should not forget that understanding 








Table I-A3. Net Home Equity, Patience, and Control Variables 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
β*δ Hybrid 











Loss Aversion (λ) 
 -149.3 
(729.5) 
  -670 
(693) 
Married  














Has Bachelor’s Degree  









Checking Account Balance to 
Income  




Savings Account Balance to 
Income  




Credit Card Debt to Income 














Adj. R-sq  0.017 0.016 0.169 0.033 0.175 
N  2977 2964 2881 2977 2869 
Regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. 













Table I-A4. Net Home Equity and Interactions with Patience 
 Model 6 Model 7  Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
β*δ Hybrid 











Loss Aversion (λ)  
-193 
(728) 
   -696 
(693) 
         λ * Patience 
-2,597 
(4,417) 




  8,560 
(7,126) 
         Married * Patience 
 18,559 
(36,918) 




  -1,511 
(5,990) 
         Male * Patience 
 25,390 
(33,317) 




  2,630*** 
(225) 
         Age * Patience 
 1,878 
(1,153) 
   
Has Bachelor’s Degree  
 15,307* 
(6,310) 
  13,705* 
(6,321) 
         Bachelor’s * Patience 
 -19,475 
(34,776) 




  0.380*** 
(0.058) 
         Income * Patience 
 0.133 
(0.284) 
   
Checking Account Balance to Income  






         Check-to-Inc * Patience 
  -1663 
(42,283) 
  
Savings Account Balance to Income  






         Savings-to-Inc * Patience 
  38,194 
(44,859) 
  
Credit Card Debt to Income 






         CC Debt to Inc * Patience 
















Adj. R-sq  0.016 0.171 0.035 0.035 0.177 
N  2964 2881 2977 2977 2869 
Regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. 







Table I-A5. Net Worth, Patience, and Control Variables 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
β*δ Hybrid 











Loss Aversion (λ)  
 -3,259 
(3,867) 
  66 
(3,588) 
Married  














Has Bachelor’s Degree  









Checking Account Balance 
to Income  




Savings Account Balance to 
Income  




Credit Card Debt to Income 














Adj. R-sq  0.031 0.030 0.238 0.041 0.245 
N  4,141 4,110 4,007 4,141 3,979 
 
Regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. 







Table I-A6. Net Worth and Interactions with Patience 
 Model 6 Model 7  Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
β*δ Hybrid  













Loss Aversion (λ)  
-3,666 
(4,143) 
    -659 
(3,323) 
         λ * Patience 
-25,892 
(33,691) 






  -21,205 
(40,618) 












  44,784† 
(25,855)  
         Male * Patience 
 251,605 
(188,118) 






  13,459*** 
(946) 





  31,400*** 
(6,535) 





  36,930 
(37,058) 
         Bachelor’s * Patience 
 -68,938 
(231,691) 






  14.38*** 
(4.291) 





  14.38*** 
(4.29) 
Checking Account Balance to 
Income  






         Check-to-Inc * Patience 
   -323,038 
(279,074) 
  
Savings Account Balance to 
Income  






         Savings-to-Inc * Patience 
   -72,102 
(232,619) 
  
Credit Card Debt to Income 
























Adj. R-sq  0.030 0.267 0.267 0.041 0.041 0.274 
N  4110 4007 4007 4141 4141 3979 
Regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. 






Appendix II-A. Sample Slider Measuring Willingness to Agree to a Contract 








Appendix II-B. Is a $20 Lease Trivial? 
One of the key findings from this research is that periodic pricing can work outside the 
domain of trivial costs.  This is seen in Study 2 where individuals are more willing to agree to a 
hypothetical car lease presented in a periodic pricing frame ($20/day) than the aggregate (yearly) 
equivalent.  As discussed throughout the essay, this essay suggests that these results were 
observed because the periodic pricing frame changed how an individual perceives the contract’s 
benefits.  Yet one plausible alternative account is that the periodic price appears relatively trivial, 
compared to the complete cost while the aggregate cost does not appear relatively trivial.  This is 
an interesting possibility warranting further study not only because it offers a conflicting account 
from the the present theory but also because, if true, it would suggest other cases where periodic 
pricing could increase purchase intentions even though it does not call to mind other contracts 
involving explicitly trivial amounts of money.  Consequently, an ancillary study tested whether 
consumers consider a car’s periodic cost to be trivial when its daily cost is a small fraction of the 
total base cost of the car, or when the daily cost involves a small number of dollars. 
In this study, 95 participants completed a fully randomized 3x3 repeated-measures study.  
The survey asked participants to suppose they were deciding whether to buy a car, and to rate 
whether they considered the proposed payment “trivial, like a cup of coffee, or very substantial.” 
The study manipulated the daily cost of the car ($2, $10 or $20) and the base cost of the car 
($10,000, $50,000, or $100,000).  Each item was presented in the format “Pay $x per day to 
lease a $y car” and participants responded on a 0-10 scale where 0 was denoted “Very Trivial 
Expense” and 10 was denoted “Very Substantial Expense.”  If triviality ratings are relative to the 
base price of the car, responses would decrease with the cost of the car, whereas if triviality 





The results indicate support for both the relative and explicit account of triviality, though 
there is much stronger support for an explicit account of triviality.  As Figure II-A2 illustrates, 
when base car cost increases by a factor of 10, a repeated measures ANOVA reveals that mean 
expensiveness ratings decrease from 4.71 to 4.04 ($10,000 vs. $50,000 vs. $100,000 total cost: 
M10k = 4.71, SD = 3.0 vs. M50k = 4.3, SD = 2.9  vs. M100k = 4.0, SD=2.9; F(2,188) = 13.4, 
p<0.0001).  As daily payments increase by a factor of 10, mean expensiveness ratings rise ($2 vs. 
$10 vs. $20 per day: M2 = 2.3, SD = 2.4 vs. M10 = 4.8, SD = 2.6 vs. M20 = 6.1, SD=2.8; F(2,188) 
= 182.3, p<0.0001).  Comparing effect sizes, however, the 10x increase in daily payment amount 
influenced triviality dramatically more than the 10x increase in base car cost: estimated partial 
  s reveal that the base car cost accounts for less than 1% of variance while the daily payment 
amount accounts for 23% of variance.  This stark contrast suggests that triviality in periodic 
pricing is much more influenced by explicit payment amount than how the amount relates to the 
full cost.  These results suggest that the findings in Study 2 are not due to the fact that the 
periodic price is low relative to the total cost of the car.  
 

















Appendix II-C. Charities Evaluated in Study 3b 
Cause 1: Homelessness in America 
- “Your company is sponsoring a donation drive to help the underprivileged in the United 
States.” 
- “The Cause: The Coalition for the Homeless provides emergency shelter, food and 
clothing as well as long-term training and housing programs.” 
Cause 2: Saving the Giant Panda 
- “Your company is sponsoring a donation drive to help preserve endangered species of 
Panda.” 
- “The Cause: The World Wild Fund for Nature (WWF) works internationally to influence 
policy-level conservation decisions to protect the Giant Panda's habitat.” 
Cause 3: Health of Children in Developing Countries 
- “Your company is sponsoring a donation drive to improve the lives of impoverished 
children in developing countries.” 
- “The Cause: The United Nation's Children's Fund (UNICEF) is a global humanitarian 
relief organization that promotes the health and well-being of children in developing 
countries.” 
Cause 4: American Veterans 
- “Your company is sponsoring a donation drive to improve the lives of wounded 
American veterans.” 
- “The Cause: The Wounded Warrior Project honors and empowers wounded American 





Appendix II-D. Methods of Scale Construction and the Scale Items Used in Study 5. 
Scale Construction 
Study 5 required constructing scales that would measure numerical ability, construal 
level, and financial/debt literacy efficiently (i.e., using few items), because of a concern that 
online participants have a limited ability to provide the attention necessary to give high-quality 
responses in a long survey.   Seventy participants completed the long-form scales in random 
order, and within each scale the items were randomized. 
First, a large numerical ability scale combined 11 items measuring numeracy (Lipkus et 
al. 2001) and 10 items measuring cognitive reflection (CRT) (Frederick, 2005; Frederick, 
personal communication, February 29, 2012).  The objective was a reliable scale of 4 to 6 items 
that contained at least two numeracy and two CRT items. Starting with a scale consisting of all 
21 items, items were iteratively eliminated based on which had the lowest item-rest correlation, 
which maximized alpha resulting from the fewest items. The final scale consisted of five items 
(two numeracy and three CRT) with a Cronbach’s α of 0.75.  Scores on this scale ranged from 
zero to one and increased by 0.2 for each item answered correctly. 
An analogous process was followed for the construal level scale. Aiming to arrive at a 
final scale with 4-6 items, items were iteratively dropped, following the procedure described 
above, from Vallacher and Wegner’s (1989) 24-item Behavioral Identification Form to arrive at 
a four-item scale (α = 0.77). Scores on this scale ranged from zero to one and increased by 0.25 
for each abstract option selected. 
Finally, a shortened scale comprised items from the 3-item financial literacy (Lusardi and 
Mitchell 2011) and debt literacy (Lusardi and Tufano 2009) scales.  Together, these six items 





eliminated.  The outcome was a four-item scale (α = 0.5988) that ranged from zero to one and 
increased by 0.25 for each item answered correctly.   
 
Scale: Numerical ability (correct answers in parentheses) 
CRT1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total.  The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball.  How much 
does the ball cost? (5 or 0.05) 
  
CRT2. In a lake, there is a patch of lilypads.  Every day, the patch doubles in size.  If it takes 48 
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of 
the lake? (47) 
  
CRT3. A 21 page album contains 480 photos.  Each page displays either 18 large photos or 24 
small photos.  How many pages display small photos? (17) 
 
NUM1. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 
1,000.  What percent of tickets of ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car? (0.1) 
 
NUM2. Suppose you have a close friend who has a lump in her breast and must have a 
mammogram.  Of 100 women like her, 10 of them actually have a malignant tumor and 90 of 
them do not.  Of the 10 women who actually have a tumor, the mammogram indicates correctly 
that 9 of them have a tumor and indicates incorrectly that 1 of them does not have a tumor.  Of 
the 90 women who do not have a tumor, the mammogram indicates correctly that 81 of them do 





summarizes all of this information.  Imagine that your friend tests positive (as if she had a 
tumor), what is the likelihood that she actually has a tumor?  (Please enter a percent.) (50) 
  Tested positive Tested negative Totals 
Actually has a tumor 9 1 10 
Does not have a tumor 9 81 90 
Totals 18 82 100 
  
 
Scale: Construal Level / Psychological Distance / Behavioral Identification Form 
* denotes concrete (vs abstract) items 
Any behavior can be described in many ways.  For example, one person might describe a 
behavior as "writing a paper," while another person might describe the same behavior as 
"pushing keys on the keyboard."  Yet another person might describe it as "expressing 
thoughts."  This form focuses on your personal preferences for how a number of different 
behaviors should be described.  Below you will find several behaviors listed.  After each 
behavior will be two different ways in which the behavior might be identified.  For example: 
        1.  Attending class 
            a.  sitting in a chair 
            b.  looking at a teacher 
Your task is to choose the identification, a or b, that best describes the behavior for 
you.  Simply select the option you prefer.  Be sure to respond to every item.  Please mark only 
one alternative for each pair.  Remember, mark the description that you personally believe is 
more appropriate for each pair. 





 Getting organized 
 Writing things down* 
CL2 Voting 
 Influencing the election 
 Marking a ballot* 
CL3 Taking a test 
 Answering questions* 
 Showing one's knowledge 
CL4 Eating 
 Getting nutrition 
 Chewing and swallowing* 
 
Scale: Financial/Debt Literacy 
* denotes correct answers 
Flit1. Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation was 
2% per year.  After 1 year, would you be able to buy more than, exactly the same as, or less than 
today with the money in this account? 
 More than today 
 Exactly the same as today 
 Less than today* 
 × I don't know 








 I don't know 
Dlit1. Suppose you owe $1000 on your credit card and the interest rate you are charged is 20% 
per year compounded annually. If you didn't pay anything off, at this interest rate, how many 
years would it take for the amount you owe to double? 
 2 years 
 Less than 5 years* 
 More than 5 years but less than 10 years 
 More than 10 years 
 Do not know 
 Prefer not to answer 
Dlit2. You owe $3,000 on your credit card. You pay a minum payment of $30 each month. At an 
Annual Percentage Rate of 12% (or 1% per month), how many years would it take to eliminate 
your credit card debt if you made no additional new charges? 
 Less than 5 years 
 Between 5 and 10 years 
 Between 10 and 15 years 
 Never, you will continue to be in debt* 
 Do not know 
 Prefer not to answer 
